Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of Distressed Corporations by Barondes, Royce de R.
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications
Fall 1998
Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of
Distressed Corporations
Royce de R. Barondes
University of Missouri School of Law, articles@legal-environment.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 45, 46-48 (1998)
19981
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
OF DISTRESSED CORPORATIONS
Royce de R. Barondes*
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 46
I. THE EFFECT OF DEBT FINANCING ON RISK PREFERENCE ............ 48
II. THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL COVENANTS ON
EXCESSIVE RISK-TAKING ......................................................... 51
1II. RISK-TAKING BY NEARLY INSOLVENT FIRMS;
CAUSES OF BANKRUPTCY .......................................................... 59
IV. APPLICABLE CORPORATION LAW PRINCIPLES ........................... 63
A. Insolvent Firms ............................................................. 63
B. Corporations in the Vicinity of Insolvency .................... 65
C. Time H orizon ................................................................. 66
D. Persons Who May Assert the Obligation ....................... 69
E. Incentives for Directors of Distressed Corporations
Created by Corporation Law; Impact on
Financial Advisors ......................................................... 71
F. Conclusions ................................................................... 82
V. COSTS OF INSOLVENCY AND IMPACT ON TRADE CREDITORS ...... 83
A. Costs of Insolvency ......................................................... 84
B. Differential Impact on Classes of Creditors ................... 88
C. Disparate Abilities to Negotiate Differential Rights ........ 98
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURE FOR FIDUCIARY
DUTIES IN DISTRESSED CORPORATIONS ..................................... 98
C ONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................... 101
A PPEND IX I ........................................................................................... 103
* Assistant Professor, Department of Finance, Louisiana State University. J.D., University of
Virginia; S.M. and S.B., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I would like to thank Cyndi McDon-
ald and participants at a seminar at Louisiana State University for helpful comments. I also thank
Ryan Mulhearn for his diligent research assistance.
HeinOnline  -- 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 45 1998-1999
GEO. MASON L. REV.
INTRODUCTION
A significant amount of recent legal scholarship has focused on
the incentives created by federal bankruptcy law and its economic effects.'
The literature has addressed the prospective impact of bankruptcy law on
the actions of a debtor while it remains solvent but is considering events
that may lead to insolvency,2 as well as bankruptcy law's impact on the
actions taken by a debtor after its insolvency.3
According to the well known "overinvestment" theory of finance,
as a corporation incurs indebtedness, the resulting capital structure gener-
ates incentives for the corporation's directors, who are assumed to act to
maximize shareholder returns, to undertake excessively risky transactions.4
The increased preference for risk arises because the debtholders incur a
disproportionate share of the downside risk, relative to the gains they re-
ceive if the transactions are successful. The theory postulates that an insol-
vent firm, or an almost insolvent firm, is an extreme example of a firm
governed by those incentives. Thus, analyses of distressed or bankrupt
firms' actions tend to take as axiomatic that the firm will engage in exces-
sively risky transactions.5
I See Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incen-
tives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1159 (1994) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects]. Recent articles
have included Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, 62 U.
CHi. L. REV. 575 (1995) [hereinafter Adler, Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives] (discussing the
incentives in bankruptcy); Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439
(1994); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN.
L. ReV. 311 (1993) (proposing a unique type of security as a contractual arrangement that could elimi-
nate reorganizations); Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 523, 526-28 (1992) (discussing various mandatory auction mechanisms); Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988) (proposing a unique
auction mechanism involving granting various classes of claimants options); Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857
(1996); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J.
1043, 1059 (1992) (arguing managers extract wealth during reorganizations, and proposing the repeal
of Chapter 11); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125 (1990)
[hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Equity's Share]; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corpo-
rate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 669 (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance] (providing empirical
evidence concerning the bankruptcy process); and Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEx. L. REV. 51 (1992) (arguing that firms should have the
option to select one of a variety of options to govern upon any insolvency of the firm).
2 See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 169-70 (1989) (discussing the
preference periods set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 547 as reflecting an attempt to control conflicts of interest
arising on the eve of bankruptcy).
3 See, e.g., LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 767-96.
4 See infra Part I
5 See, e.g., Adler, Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, supra note 1, at 590-98 (discussing
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This Article argues that this widely-accepted premise for analyz-
ing the incentives created by various alternative structures of federal bank-
ruptcy law is suspect. Part I briefly reviews the economic background of
debt financing. Parts II and HI challenge the relationship between that the-
ory and actual actions of corporations that are in distress. Part II shows that
in many circumstances, when a corporation is in distress, holders of its
debt will in fact prefer that the firm engage in transactions more risky than
the equityholders would prefer. Consistent with that understanding, Part III
reviews recent economic evidence indicating that distressed corporations
engage in excessively risky transactions to only a modest extent.
Parts IV and V address developments in corporation law that im-
pose certain incentives on directors of distressed firms. These incentives
are far more likely to affect actions of directors of solvent, distressed firms
than the incentives created by bankruptcy law. In two recent cases not
prominently addressed in legal scholarship, In re Buckhead America
Corp.6 and In re Shultz,7 courts have opined that directors of solvent, dis-
tressed corporations can be personally liable to creditors for failing to
promote the creditors' interests. Other commentators have noted the possi-
bility that courts would hold prior Delaware state court precedent could
require the result reached in In re Buckhead America Corp. and In re
Shultz. 8 Part IV of this Article examines that prior Delaware precedent in
voidable preference law as a mechanism to mitigate "overinvestment"); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas
H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REv. 829, 833-34
(1985) (arguing that fraudulent conveyance law should not permit avoidance of all transactions that
harm creditors as a group, on the basis that the "overinvestment" problem necessarily causes firms to
engage in additional risk-taking subsequent to their incurring indebtedness); Bebchuk & Fried, supra
note 1, at 873, 875, 897 (identifying the "overinvestment" theory as the basis for the creation of secu-
rity interests, which are accorded preferred priority in bankruptcy, and arguing, "Full priority may also
cause commercial borrowers and their sophisticated creditors to use a security interest that is less
efficient than a set of covenants in order to control inefficient behavior by the borrower after the loan
transaction."); Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1052 ("If we think of 'default' as the act by
which equity holders relinquish all claims to their firm's net cash flow, it is clear that equity holders
have an incentive to generate the social costs discussed above [-'overinvestment' and 'underinvest-
ment'-] only when they perceive that the firm is near default. Accordingly, we refer to these costs as
'near-default' costs, by which we mean the social costs generated by suboptimal operating strategies
that cause wealth transfers from bondholders and other corporate stakeholders, and, ultimately, reduce
social welfare."); Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects, supra note 1, at 1167-1210 (discussing the impact of
bankruptcy reform proposals on "overinvestment" and describing the "overinvestment" problem as
"long recognized").
6 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance Capital Group,
Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178 B.R. 956, 968 (D. Del. 1994). See also Weaver v. Kellogg, 216
B.R. 563, 583-84 (S.D. Tex. 1997) ("[Clorporate insiders ... may have a fiduciary duty to the corpo-
ration's creditors even when the corporation was not insolvent. The Court holds that Plaintiff may
therefore prevail on his breach of corporate duty claims if he shows, for each allegedly wrongful trans-
action, that [the debtor] was, at the time, in 'the vicinity of insolvency'.., ." (emphasis added) (citing
Credit Lyonnais)).
7 Miramar Resources, Inc. v. Shultz (In re Shultz), 208 B.R. 723, 729 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
8 See John C. Coffee Jr., Court Has a New Idea on Directors' Duty, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 2, 1992,
at 18 (noting that prior Delaware precedent had used the duty as a "shield," not a "sword," although
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greater detail than was expressed in either of In re Buckhead America
Corp. or In re Shultz and concludes that the result in those cases represents
the most fair reading of prior Delaware precedent.
Part IV also addresses the substantial incentives these develop-
ments in corporation law impose on directors of distressed corporations.
Part IV argues that ambiguities inherent in applying these developing du-
ties under corporation law impose a standard directors cannot meet. That
Part further provides an expanded review of potentially applicable prece-
dent, concluding that the better reading is that these duties cannot be
waived by contract. Part IV then argues that directors will not be able to
ameliorate these concerns by purchasing insurance.
These developments indirectly create additional problems for dis-
tressed corporations, because liability may subsequently be imposed on
investment banks engaged by distressed firms. This risk of liability can be
expected ultimately to increase the cost to distressed firms of engaging,
and to limit their access to, financial advisors.
Part V discusses the extent to which legal rules imposing incen-
tives on directors of distressed firms need not equally affect different types
of creditors. Part V argues that these developments in corporation law
uniquely and adversely affect certain classes of creditors who are not eas-
ily able to negotiate for alternative treatment, thereby compounding the
inefficiency generated by these recent developments in corporation law.
Part V also reviews empirical evidence that further supports the view that
these developments in corporation law are inefficient.
Based on these concerns, Part VI discusses the benefits of a more
limited revision of the fiduciary duties of directors of distressed, solvent
corporations-reinforcing the authority of directors to choose to pursue the
ongoing solvency of a distressed corporation, even at the expense of fore-
going other opportunities potentially providing greater long-term returns.
That Part further argues that even allowing creditors to commence deriva-
tive lawsuits challenging self-dealing is problematic. This Article then
provides some concluding remarks.
I. THE EFFECT OF DEBT FINANCING ON RISK PREFERENCE
The theory of the corporate enterprise has long recognized that
conflicting incentives are created when a corporation issues debt.9 When
creditors could "have a field day" using that precedent in bankruptcy courts); see also infra note 75
and accompanying text.
9 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334 (1976); see also WILLLAM A. KLEIN
& JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 255-58 (5th ed. 1993); Baird &
Jackson, supra note 5, at 833-34; Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 873; Bradley & Rosenzweig,
supra note 1, at 1052; F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1426-27
[VOL. 7:1
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part of the capital structure of a corporation consists of bonds, the return to
shareholders from pursuing risky strategies increases, by virtue of the dis-
proportionate share of the risk of failure allocated to debtholders. The the-
ory further predicts that when a corporation is insolvent' ° or on the verge
of insolvency, the incentive to pursue risky investment strategies may in-
crease." These incentives can become very powerful for a corporation
(1986); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J.
49, 67 (1982); LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 683-84; Rasmussen, Ex
Ante Effects, supra note 1, at 1166-70.
10 There are alternative tests of insolvency, which depend on the context. Under federal bank-
ruptcy law, a corporate debtor is insolvent when the sum of its debts exceeds the value of all its prop-
erty (excluding exempted property and property fraudulently concealed, etc.), at a "fair valuation." 11
U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) (1994). Section 2 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 7A U.L.A. 648 (mas-
ter ed. 1985), adopts the definition of insolvency used in the bankruptcy code. See Bruce A. Markell,
Toward True and Plain Dealing: A Theory of Fraudulent Transfers Involving Unreasonably Small
Capital, 21 IND. L. REv. 469, 486 (1988). For this purpose, "A debtor who is generally not paying his
[or her] debts as they become due is presumed to be insolvent." UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §
2(b), 7A U.L.A. 648 (1985).
Under Delaware corporation law, a debtor may be considered insolvent, which triggers the
right of a creditor to petition a court for the appointment of a receiver, "where liabilities exceed assets,
or where the corporation is unable to meet its current obligations arising in the ordinary course of
business." FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: FUNDAMENTALS § 291.2, at 749
(Edward P. Welch & Andrew J. Turezyn eds., 1997) [hereinafter FOLK]. The court in Geyer v. Inger-
soll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992), suggested that insolvency under either a negative
net assets test or a cash flow test was sufficient to create liability of directors of a corporation to its
creditors under state corporation law, discussed infra Part W.A. The opinion references both tests,
citing Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, but omits further relevant discussion. See Geyer, 621 A.2d at
789. The Geyer opinion thus leaves some uncertainty concerning the proper definition of insolvency
in this context. See Mike Roberts, The Conundrum of Directors' Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corpora-
tions, 23 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 273, 289 (1993).
11 See Adler, Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, supra note 1, at 576-77; Katherine H.
Daigle & Michael T. Maloney, Residual Claims in Bankruptcy: An Agency Theory Explanation, 37
J.L. & ECON. 157, 157 (1994) (stating that shareholders' incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking
are "particularly acute" when the firm is distressed); Daniel L. Keating, Foreword: A Bankruptcy
Conference for the '90s, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 797, 807 (1994) (referencing "the inherent conflict be-
tween creditors and shareholders that heightens as a firm approaches and enters a state of insolvency");
Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to
Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1486, 1488-91 (1993); LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Govern-
ance, supra note 1, at 684; George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession
Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901, 912 (1993). But see Philippe Aghion et al., Improving Bankruptcy
Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 854 (1994) (arguing that self-interest, and not a desire to promote
the interests of shareholders, rules the actions of managers of nearly insolvent, large, public firms).
There also is a theoretical argument that an insolvent firm will in fact "underinvest" in proj-
ects, i.e., fail to enter into transactions that would be profitable from the perspective of the firm as a
whole, due to indifference. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 9, at 258-61; James W. Bowers, Reha-
bilitation, Redistribution or Dissipation: The Evidence for Choosing Among Bankruptcy Hypotheses,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 955, 971 (1994); Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1052; Daniel E. Ingber-
man, Triggers and Priority: An Integrated Model of the Effects of Bankruptcy Law on Overinvestment
and Underinvestment, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1342 (1994); Lin, supra, at 1496; Rasmussen, ExAnte
Effects, supra note 1, at 1171; Triantis, supra, at 911 (discussing this theory). This theory is based on
the notion that shareholders will not invest new equity (or other efforts) needed to permit implementa-
tion of a new project having a positive return, if the portion of the return to be realized by shareholders
will be inadequate, because the returns will be given to other stakeholders, i.e., creditors. See KLEIN &
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approaching insolvency, because the shareholders may be essentially indif-
ferent as among all outcomes involving a non-positive return, negative
returns of a distressed corporation being almost entirely borne by the
creditors. 12
Recent empirical finance literature has attempted to identify the
relationship between the extent to which firms take risk and the adoption
of a form of business organization that permits separate debt financing.
This evidence supports the notion that creating debt interests separate from
equity interests may increase the firm's risk-taking.
One study examined excessive risk-taking by reviewing the rela-
tive risk-taking activities by thrift institutions, based on whether they are
organized as mutual companies-where the fixed claims of the customers
are not separable from ownership--or stock companies.13 The study found
that thrift institutions organized as stock companies experienced signifi-
cantly greater variability in profit than thrift institutions organized as mu-
tual companies.14 Other authors found that property liability insurance
companies organized as stock companies, as compared to property liability
insurance companies organized as mutual companies, (i) have more total
risk, (ii) have relatively more business in the lines with the greatest risk,
and (iii) have a greater concentration of business in geographic areas hay-
COFFEE, supra note 9, at 258-61; Triantis, supra, at 911.
12 A similar perverse incentive is involved in an auction of an insolvent entity (or group of assets
sold separately in insolvency proceedings) in which a claimant having a senior security interest in the
assets being sold can "bid in" its claim, i.e., deliver as payment for a successful bid in the auction
consideration in the form of the claim, valued at its face amount. In such an auction, the senior claim-
ant can bid up to the value of its claim, including the extent to which the face amount of the claim
exceeds the value of the assets, with no adverse economic consequence upon a successful bid. See,
e.g., Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1997) (giving an exam-
ple). (This problem is widely recognized in the community of commercial lawyers having at least a
passing familiarity with reorganization negotiations.) This fact, coupled with the economic analysis
named the Winner's Curse, creates a pattern in which a senior claimant acquiring an insolvent debtor's
assets in an auction forming part of the insolvency proceedings may cause the equityholders to suffer
losses greater than might otherwise be anticipated, by deterring third parties from bidding on the
debtor's assets. Cf., e.g., Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REv. 597,
625-28 (1989) (discussing the Winner's Curse, in the context of takeovers). In such a circumstance, at
least where all assets in which a senior claimant has a senior interest are sold as a unit and at a price
less than the senior claim, the senior claimant is not adversely affected by making a successful bid in
excess of the value of the collateral, because it pays the excess to itself. Other bidders need to provide
bids lower than their estimates of value, in order to assure that they do not overpay (and suffer the
Winner's Curse). This bidding framework is not particularly inviting for potential bidders other than
senior claimants, and might adversely affect the junior claimants, even if the senior claimants ulti-
mately determined not to bid. These incentives create serious problems for proposals to substitute
mandatory auctions of insolvent debtors' assets, where the auctions are structured in a traditional
format, for reorganizations under Chapter 11, if the senior claimants can bid. See infra note 137 for a
discussion of such proposals.
13 See Benjamin C. Esty, Organizational Form and Risk Taking in the Savings and Loan Indus-
try, 44 J. FIN. ECON. 25 (1997).
14 See id. at 36.
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ing the greatest risk.'I
Thus, there is some recent empirical support for the general propo-
sition that inclusion in an enterprise's capital structure of debt separate
from equity is associated with the enterprise undertaking relatively more
risk.'6
II. THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL COVENANTS ON EXCESSIVE RISK-TAKING
This theoretical perspective, under which corporations are ex-
pected to have increased preferences for risk as they increase their lever-
age, is based on an abstract view of the corporate form in which the details
of the terms of the debt are disregarded. However, when one considers the
details of some customary debt terms (separate from direct restrictions on
entering new lines of business 7 or capital expenditures), one can conclude
that for solvent but distressed firms, some debtholders may prefer that the
distressed firm adopt strategies involving more risk than the strategies pre-
ferred by shareholders. The terms thus create incentives for firms not to
engage in excessive risk-taking.
When a corporation has long-term, fixed-rate debt, there is on the
order of a fifty percent chance that interest rates at any point in time are
less than the market rates in effect at the time the corporation borrowed
money, ignoring the possibility that interest rates are exactly the same.
Thus, assuming all other events being equal and ignoring the costs of refi-
nancing, half of the time a long-term lender would prefer to require re-
payment and refinancing of all a debtor's currently outstanding loans. This
figure is only an approximation, if one assumes that the yield curve for
debt is in a customary form, i.e., interest rates increase for increasing terms
to maturity. Nevertheless, a significant portion of the time, a long-term
lender would prefer to require a particular debtor to refinance its fixed-rate
debt at then-prevailing interest rates.
But many firms in financial distress will be in financial positions
significantly worse than their financial positions when their outstanding
long-term debt was originally incurred. Numerous creditors of such firms
would like to have the opportunity to renegotiate the long-term, fixed-rate
15 See Joan Lamm-Tennant & Laura T. Starks, Stock Versus Mutual Ownership Structures: The
Risk Implications, 66 J. Bus. 29, 37,44 (1993).
16 Of course, this separation only arises where shareholders are not personally liable on the debt.
As Baird notes, small closely-held firms, which account for 38% of the United States GNP, typically
have a single institutional lender that "frequently" receives a personal guarantee from the "owner-
manager," eliminating for a vast set of businesses the possibility of perverse incentives. Douglas G.
Baird, The Reorganization of Closely Held Firms and the "Opt Out" Problem, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 913,
920-21 (1994).
17 Van Der Weide argues that the ability of a firm to engage in excessive risk-taking is limited
where the firm is engaged in a single line of business. Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary
Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 27, 45-46 (1996).
1998]
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debt. Once triggered,18 a financial covenant gives a creditor the opportu-
nity either (i) to renegotiate the terms of outstanding debt, by threatening
to accelerate the indebtedness if the debt is not refinanced on terms more
favorable to the creditorsl9-which could be viewed as extracting a
"bribe" to prevent the exercise of remedies--or (ii) to exercise restraint on
management, either directly, because the covenant grants that right, or
indirectly, by threatening to accelerate the debt if specified changes are not
implemented.2" Therefore, creditors of firms that are nearly insolvent, and
close to triggering financial covenants in their long-term debt, may have an
incentive to cause the covenants to be triggered, thereby creating the op-
portunity to renegotiate the terms of existing debt.21
18 The documents under which a secured loan is extended typically will require that the debtor
periodically confirm in writing that there is no existing event of default. See, eg., JAMES J.
CUNNINGHAM ET AL., STRUCTURING SECURED COMMERCIAL LOAN DOCUMENTS 12-10 (1991) (dis-
cussing a sample security agreement for a secured loan requiring the chief financial officer to deliver
such a statement on a monthly basis). Potential personal liability for fraudulently certifying the ab-
sence of a default should temper any desire to fail to report an existing default.
19 The recent difficulties of Sunbeam Corporation include an example of creditors conditioning
waiver of a covenant triggered by adverse developments in the debtor's business, in exchange for a
higher interest rate. Sunbeam Corporation had obtained a $1.7 billion loan in March 1998. See Martha
Brannigan, Sunbeam Gets Six-Month Waiver on Convenants but a Higher Rate, WALL ST. J., July 13,
1998, at B4. The loan matures in part in 2005 and in part in 2006. See Sunbeam Corporation, Qua-
terly Report on Form 10-Q 6 (Mar. 31, 1998), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Filing File. In
exchange for a waiver of a covenant breach, the lenders required that Sunbeam increase the annual
interest rate by one-half percentage point. See Brannigan, supra.
20 Creditors in fact exercise their contractual rights to control the business decisions of nearly
insolvent debtors. See Jackson & Scott, supra note 2, at 170; see also Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R.
Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in Financially Distressed Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
1005, 1008-10 (1994) (identifying the extent to which debtors of firms that successfully restructured
their debt "out of court" granted the creditors additional control rights as a part of the work-out). But
cf. id. at 1024 (noting that the replacement of a CEO (or certain changes in his pay) by creditors was
not related in a statistically significant way to the proximity of the debtor to insolvency).
But, creditors participating in the daily management of a firm risk having their claims equita-
bly subordinated in any subsequent bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994). See Gilson &
Vetsuypens, supra, at 1005; Lin supra note 11, at 1504-05. See generally JOSEPH W. BARTLETT,
CORPORATE RESTRUCIURINGS, REORGANIZATIONS, AND BUYOUTS § 3.4, at 46 (1991) (noting in
discussing those actions by creditors that will constitute "egregious misconduct" and thereby cause
those creditors' claims to be equitably subordinated, "The results in the reported cases are fact-specific
in the extreme."). Alternatively, those creditors may be subject to liability to the debtor on a lender
liability theory. Gilson & Vetsuypens, supra, at 1005.
A creditor may also not want to participate in the debtor's management where the debtor may
have significant environmental liabilities. Such participation could cause the creditor to become re-
sponsible for those liabilities. See generally Kelley ex rel. Mich. Nat'l Resources Comm'n v. Tiscor-
nia, No. 94-1403, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33616, at *6-*9 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1996) (affirming the lower
court's holding that the lender had not participated in management, within the meaning of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, as
amended by the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 2501-05, 110 Stat. 3009-462 to -469 (1996)).
21 Lin identifies a variant of this perspective. She discusses a proposed legal rule in which
creditors could bargain for the right to have the firm's directors maximize firm value if the firm were
to become distressed. In addressing creditors who had bargained for such a right, she states:
One potential drawback of this rule is that it may be subject to abuse by creditors.
[VOL. 7:1
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An example illustrates the extent to which a creditor's ability to
extract a payment in exchange for a covenant waiver can create incentives
under which a creditor may desire the firm to adopt strategies entailing
more risk than is desired by shareholders. Consider a corporation that has
outstanding long-term debt of $10 million, with interest payable annually
at eight percent and with the principal due in ten years. Assume that the
firm's loan agreement has a cash flow coverage ratio, which requires that
any project in which the firm invests must generate net cash flow that ex-
ceeds the interest payments due on the loan by at least a factor of 1.3. As-
sume further that interest rates have risen, so that were the loan extended
today, it would bear interest at ten percent per annum.
The firm may pursue two possible investment strategies. Invest-
ment Strategy One involves a 100% chance of a $1.1 million annual return
in perpetuity (with all payments commencing on the anniversary of the
strategy's adoption), after all payments other than those due on the debt.
Before payment of principal and interest on the debt, this strategy has a
value of $11 million (at a ten percent annual discount rate).22 Investment
Strategy Two has two possible outcomes. In one outcome, the firm's loan
cannot be called because the firm breaches no debt covenant. In the other
outcome, the firm breaches a debt covenant, resulting in the loan being
called and refinanced at the current interest rate. The expected value of this
strategy, excluding payment on the debt, is $11,189,540. These two strate-
gies are depicted below.
For example, Company X has a long-term note with a fixed interest rate at ten per-
cent per annum. Although the loan does not mature for another ten years, because
of a steady increase in the level of inflation, the current interest rate for a loan
with similar terms is fifteen percent per annum. Under these circumstances, to es-
cape unfavorable terms creditors may have an incentive to claim that the directors
have breached the loan agreement by failing to maximize the firm's value. If
creditors can declare default and accelerate the maturity of their loan, they will be
able to earn a higher rate of return by lending their funds at the new rate.
Lin, supra note 11, at 1506 (emphasis added).
Secured creditors of a distressed firm also may have an incentive to cause the debtor to adopt
certain policies that enhance the value of the secured creditors' collateral, at the expense of other
creditors. See Jackson & Scott, supra note 2, at 173 n.38.
22 A 10% rate is used to discount all payment streams in the example. One might argue that a
higher discount rate should be used to compute the values of the payment streams in Strategies Two
and Three, because those strategies involve greater risk in the payment streams. Incorporation of that
additional complexity does not affect the accuracy of the proposition that the examples illustrate,
although it would obscure the point of the examples with a necessarily heuristic discussion of the
selection of the risk-adjusted interest rates incorporated.
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Strate2v One
Present Value
Probability Return Each Year at 10%
100% $1,100,000 $11,000,000
Expected Value of Strategy Value of
(Before Debt Payments) Interest Payments Value of Equity Long-Term Debt
$11,000,000 $800,000 per year $2,228,913 $8,771,087
Strateuv Two
Return Each of Annual Present Value
Probabili First Five Years Return Thereafter at 10%
50% $1,000,000 $1,100,000 $10,620,922
50% $1,300,000 $1,100,000 $11,758,158
Expected Value of Strategy Value of
(Before Debt Payments) Interest Payments Value of Equity2  Long-Term Debt
$11,189,540 $1,000,000 per year, .5 x $620,922 + .5 x $10,000,000 +
if return less than .5 x 2,987,071 = .5 x $8,771,087 =
$1,040,000, in the
first year $1,803,997 $9,385,543
$800,000 per year, if
return at least
$1,040,000, every year
23 The value of the equity and the value of the long-term debt are computed by reference to the
value of the firm as a whole (under the caption Present Value at 10%). First, the value of the long-
term debt is computed for each of the two possible outcomes. Then, the value of the equity is com-
puted by subtracting the value of the long-term debt from the value of the firm.
In the first listed possible outcome, involving an annual return of $1,000,000 in each of the
first five years, the long-term debt is in default. It is assumed that the outcome of the strategy (whether
the return will be $1,000,000 or $1,300,000 in each of the first five years), is revealed immediately
after the strategy is adopted. The long-term debt consequently is assumed to be immediately acceler-
ated, with the entire outstanding principal amount, $10,000,000, returned to the creditor and loaned at
the then-prevailing 10% interest rate. Because that outcome results in the immediate return to the
lender of $10,000,000, that outcome thus has a present value to the creditor of $10,000,000.
This computation includes a simplification used to facilitate the presentation of the arithmetic.
In an ordinary case, a default would not be declared until the end of the first year. The assumption has
been made merely to simplify the calculations presented.
The value of the equity in that outcome equals (i) the value of the firm after all claims other
than the long-term debt minus (ii) the value of the long-term debt ($10,620,922 - $10,000,000 =
$620,922).
The value to the debt in the second possible outcome, involving a return of $1,300,000 in each
of the first five years, is computed as follows: The debt cannot be accelerated, because the cash flow
coverage ratio is met. Consequently, the value of the long-term debt equals the present value, dis-
counted at 10% per annum, of (i) $800,000 at the end of each of the nine following years plus (ii)
$10,800,000 (representing interest for the last year plus the return of the principal) at the end of 10
years. That value is computed as follows: $4,607,219 + $4,163,868 = $8,771,087. The value of the
equity in that outcome equals (i) the value of the firm after all claims other than the long-term debt
minus (ii) the value of the long-term debt ($11,758,158 - $8,771,087 = $2,987,071).
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The shareholders prefer Strategy One because it produces the highest
return to the equity, even though the aggregate return from the strategy
desired by the equity is less than that of an available alternative. However,
the debtholders prefer Strategy Two because that strategy produces a
greater return to the debt.
Note, however, if the firm is presented with a choice between
Strategy One and a third option described below having a present value of
$10,810,461, Strategy Three, the debtholders would still prefer not to
choose Strategy One, even though the expected return to the firm as a
whole is greater in Strategy One than in Strategy Three.
Strategy Three
Return Each of Annual Present Value
Probability First Five Years Return Thereafter at 10%
50% $1,000,000 $1,100,000 $10,620,922
50% $1,100,000 $1.100,000 $11,000,000
Expected Value of Strategy Value of
(Before Debt Payments) Interest Payments Value of Equity 24 Long-Term Debt
$10,810,461 $1,000,000 per year, .5 x $620,922 + .5 x $10,000,000 +
if return less than .5 x $2,228,913 = .5 x $8,771,087 =
$1,040,000, in
the first year $1,424,917 $9,385,543
$800,000 per year, if
return at least
$1,040,000, every year
The capital structure of an actual firm is more complex, and this
complexity exacerbates the problems for management. A firm's long-term
debt may consist of both privately placed debt-under which the creditors
are either banks or other investors such as pension funds and insurance
companies-and publicly issued debt. A creditor usually is not a third
party beneficiary of financial covenants in debt instruments to which the
creditor is not a party.25 As a result, creditors not parties to a debt instru-
24 The components of the value of the equity are computed as described supra note 23. The
value of the equity in the first possible outcome, in which the debt is accelerated, is computed as fol-
lows: $10,620,922 - $10,000,000 = $620,922. The value of the equity in the second possible outcome
is computed as follows: $11,000,000 - $8,771,087 = $2,228,913.
25 Cf. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 18, 15.05, at 15-5 (1991) (providing in a form loan
security agreement, a section stating that the agreement is "binding upon and inure[s] to the benefit of"
the successors and assigns of the parties, without any indication of third parties being beneficiaries).
Where third parties are not named, it will be difficult for them to argue that they are intended benefici-
aries, without whose consent the agreement cannot be modified. Cf., e.g., John St. Leasehold LLC v.
FDIC, No. 95 Civ. 10174, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19050, at *5, *30 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996) (holding
that there was no intent indicated to grant a borrower a right to recover for a breach of a participation
agreement, under which participations in the loan to the borrower were conveyed to other lenders,
where the participation agreement stated that the agreement "shall inure to the benefit of and be bind-
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ment cannot enforce its covenants or object to their waiver. Thus, a credi-
tor frequently can waive compliance with a particular covenant in ex-
change for a more favorable interest rate or some other compensation that
need not to be shared with the other creditors, and the other creditors'
ability to "free ride" on the benefits flowing from that covenant is substan-
tially reduced.26
ing upon the parties hereto and their respective assigns," language indistinguishable from the provision
in the form security agreement reproduced in CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 18, 15.05, at 15-5);
MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equip. Fin., Inc., No. 91 Civ. 5153, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 363, at *38
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1994) (citing language in loan documentation that the agreement shall be binding
upon, and inure to the benefit of, the parties and their successors and assigns, as "demonstratfing] that
the parties specifically intended not to confer third party beneficiary status upon anyone");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981) (limiting intended beneficiaries, to whom
performance is owed under section 304 of the Restatement, to only those persons as to whom "recog-
nition of a right to performance in the beneficiaries is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the
parties and ... the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit
of the promised performance.").
26 Some commentators argue that parties granted security interests monitor a debtor's activities
on behalf of all stakeholders. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 9, at 54-59 (arguing that secured financ-
ing prevents free riding on secured parties' monitoring by other creditors). Drawing on that argument,
two commentators make a similar argument concerning the proper level of covenants. Bebchuk and
Fried argue that creditors do not use an optimal level of contractual covenants, and instead accept
security interests of which they necessarily are the sole beneficiaries, because creditors who obtain
contractual benefits in the form of covenant protection will gamer only a portion of the benefits of the
covenants. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 900. But monitoring compliance with financial ratios is
not similar to monitoring the status of particular assets. "Monitoring" compliance with financial ratios,
in many circumstances, may merely consist of confirming that no default is indicated on the periodic
report. See generally CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 18, 12.07, at 12-10 (providing form security
agreement for a secured loan, in which the debtor's chief financial officer is required to certify every
month that there is no event constituting a breach of, or an "Event of Default" under, the security
agreement). The secured creditor, therefore, may not perform any material "monitoring," in the sense
of actually performing tasks requiring material effort or unique skill. This "monitoring" consists of
merely administrative activity requiring minimal effort.
This conclusion is particularly true of trustees under indentures for publicly issued bonds.
Those trustees obtain the contractual right to rely on the periodic reports of no default delivered by the
respective issuer. See, e.g., MODEL SIMPLIFIED INDENTURE § 7.02(a), reprinted in Model Simplified
Indenture, 38 Bus. LAw. 741, 759 (1983); AMERICAN BAR FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES
257 (1971) (commenting on section 6-3(f) of the American Bar Foundation, Sample Incorporating
Indenture, All Registered Issues (1967)). See generally Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance
Structure for Corporate Bonds 37 (Jan. 8, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (noting
that a trustee under an indenture for publicly issued debt provides minimal monitoring, stating that a
trustee has disincentives to monitor intensively and citing a case in which a rating agency detected a
covenant breach before it was identified by the trustee). Levmore, however, draws a different conclu-
sion, asserting, "The reliability of the trustee as monitor, however, is enhanced by its high reputational
interest." Levmore, supra note 9, at 72-73. See also Van Der Weide, supra note 17, at 35 (asserting
that a trustee under an indenture can monitor a firm's management).
As to some types of covenants, a lender's inability to attribute a dollar value to the harm
arising to the lender from a breach of those covenants may prevent the lender from excluding third
parties from benefitting from those covenants. Covenants requiring maintenance of the debtor's prop-
erty may be such covenants. See generally Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured
Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1169-70 (1979) (asserting that an
unsecured creditor cannot rely on monitoring by a secured creditor, because the secured creditor can
accept a payment in consideration of waiver of compliance). But a creditor who has extended a long-
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A debt agreement may contain a provision under which the debt
becomes due and payable upon the acceleration of other indebtedness. 27 If
a corporation has outstanding publicly-issued debt, other creditors will
attempt to negotiate defaults that permit them to exercise remedies, and
negotiate a satisfactory outcome, before either public debt is in default or
the debtor's position becomes hopeless.28
A creditor benefitting from these covenants could extract from a
debtor having debt bearing interest at less than the then-current market
rate, based on the then-current risk of nonpayment, up to the additional
cost to the debtor of refinancing both the debt that could be accelerated
and all other debt that would become due upon its acceleration.29 In fact, a
bank that (i) had extended credit that was at the then-current, risk-adjusted
market rate and (ii) had the ability to declare the loan in default under a
covenant, could still extract compensation from the debtor, if the debtor
had outstanding long-term debt at a below-market rate owed to other
creditors that would become due and payable on a declaration of a default
by the bank.30
An example can illustrate this argument. Assume that a corpora-
tion has outstanding long-term bank debt whose payments have a present
value of $80 and a face amount of $100. Assume that the corporation also
has outstanding long-term public debt having a present value of $80 and a
term loan to a debtor whose financial fortunes have deteriorated is much more likely to demand that
payment, in the form of an increased interest rate. Financial covenants in this context, therefore, can
present a right on which third party creditors cannot free ride.
27 See AMERICAN BAR FOUND., supra note 26, at 215; Lin, supra note 11, at 1507 (stating that
the existence of a cross-default provision in an agreement makes the debtor's compliance with that
provision more likely).
28 Collective action problems applicable to the holders of publicly issued debt limit the ability of
bondholders to negotiate waivers of compliance with bond covenants. Other lenders therefore may
view covenants in public debt to be difficult to waive. See generally Royce de R. Barondes, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Potential for Coercion in Consent Solicitations for Bonds, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
749 (1994) (discussing the process by which those covenants can be waived). A bank or other limited
group of financial institutions that negotiates directly with a borrower in connection with the original
extension of credit prefers to be able to negotiate with a debtor in financial distress before a default
occurs under publicly issued indebtedness. That is, a bank would view an event triggering a default
under public debt as one that would have a high probability of resulting in the bankruptcy of the
debtor. Thus, a bank prefers to have the opportunity to make adjustments in the debtor's management
and strategies before a default arises under public debt.
29 Finns frequently have only one institutional lender. See Baird, supra note 16, at 921; Robert
E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901, 949 (1986). For these
firms, therefore, the institutional lender's ability to extract the value of below-market interest rate on
debt would be limited.
30 This relationship differs from the "underinvestment" phenomenon generally discussed in the
finance literature. See supra note 11. Underinvestment arises from a de minimis equity value causing
shareholders to be indifferent among certain investment strategies, resulting in "properly" risky trans-
actions not being consummated. The circumstance discussed here is one in which shareholders have a
clear preference, but that preference is to pursue less risky strategies than would be pursued were the
capital structure not to include debt.
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face amount of $100. If the bank debt were in default and the public debt
were not in default but would be in default were the bank debt accelerated,
the bank could extract up to $40 from the corporation in exchange for not
accelerating the bank debt, as long as this side payment would not bank-
rupt the debtor.
One might argue that competition from other lenders would pre-
vent an existing lender from extracting the amount representing the extent
to which debt owed to other creditors was below market. This argument
posits that if the current bank attempts to charge more than $20, the debtor
will merely arrange to have another lender pay off the existing bank loan.
However, institutional lenders must expend significant resources to review
their debtors' financial status. Therefore, existing lenders have a cost ad-
vantage in extending loans to their debtors.3
These costs therefore limit competition from other lenders and in-
crease an existing lender's ability to extract amounts from those to whom
it has already extended credit. Moreover, a loan that is in default may not
be subject to prepayment without a premium. 32 Therefore, under these
circumstances, lenders may be able to extract more than the value that they
would receive from refinancing their own extension of credit at current
market rates.
This analysis demonstrates the possibility that the financial cove-
nants in outstanding long-term debt may restrain a debtor from taking ex-
cessive risks involving potentially adverse outcomes that would result in
the firm being sufficiently close to insolvency so as to trigger one or more
covenants. It is the lender's ability to extract consideration from the debtor
in exchange for not accelerating the debt that can deter risk-seeking. It is
important to note, however, that the above analysis does not depend on
creditors' frequently extracting payments in the course of actual commer-
cial lending at every available opportunity. Extracting those payments
would probably alienate borrowers and taint the respective lender's repu-
tation. One would expect such payments to be extracted only in an end-
game strategy with the borrower, which could arise when the adverse fi-
nancial condition was caused by excessive risk-taking.
This Part has discussed the effect that debt financing has on the
risk preference of firms operating in the vicinity of insolvency. The tradi-
tional "overinvestment" theory, on which much of the law and economics
literature discussing bankruptcy incentives is premised, would predict
31 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 26, at 1174 (arguing that the informational advantage
gained by individual lenders explains why debtors engage in "repeat" transactions with particular
creditors); Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects, supra note 1, at 1195.
32 Yield maintenance provisions are common in privately placed debt, but not publicly offered
debt. See William A. Klein et al., The Call Provision of Corporate Bonds: A Standard Form in Need of
Change, 18 J. CORP. L. 653, 666 n.57 (1993) (stating that 85% of a sample of private redeemable debt
contained yield maintenance provisions, which are uncommon in redeemable public debt).
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rampant risk-taking by very distressed firms, absent other control mecha-
nisms. Covenants that restrict capital expenditures without the consent of a
lender or that limit lines of business directly restrain excessive risk-taking,
independent of the debtor's financial status. Financial covenants in long-
term, fixed-rate debt-covenants that permit acceleration of the debt upon
failure of results of operations or balance sheet information to meet certain
numbers or ratios--can create indirect but powerful incentives that can
significantly restrain excessive risk-taking by distressed firms.
III. RISK-TAKING BY NEARLY INSOLVENT FIRMS; CAUSES OF
BANKRUPTCY
The theoretical refinement in Part II of the implications of the
"overinvestment" theory merely identifies the possibility that financial
covenants may restrain excessive risk-taking by financially distressed
firms. Of course, other factors may limit excessive risk-taking, such as
covenants directly restricting investments, ethical considerations or a man-
ager's reputational interest in not being affiliated with a business that fails.
Perhaps particularly significant are managers' incentives to pro-
long the firms' operations to continue their employment. Not surprisingly,
one recent study found, "Almost one-third of the CEOs in our sample are
replaced in a given year around default. 33 Frequently, substantial reduc-
tions in compensation are imposed on the CEOs who continue employ-
ment notwithstanding default.34 Another study found that only one-fourth
of original CEOs remained in place throughout bankruptcy proceedings. 35
Managers who realize insolvency is likely to result in the termination of
their employment thus have substantial personal incentives to avoid strate-
gies that increase the probability of financial distress. 36 A manager's in-
ability to diversify this risk magnifies this incentive's significance. 37 Con-
33 Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed
Firms: An Empirical Analysis, 48 J. FIN. 425, 426 (1993).
34 See id.
35 Brian L. Betker, Management's Incentives, Equity's Bargaining Power, and Deviations from
Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 68 J. Bus. 161, 174 (1995). Betker uses "original CEO"
to refer to the CEO "who held office 2 years prior to the firm's first debt default." Id. at 172.
36 See LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 684 ("[A] manager whose
job and company are not immediately in jeopardy might prefer investments with risks that are lower
than those preferred by the company's investors."). Adler makes the opposite argument--that manag-
ers of an insolvent firm will attempt to pursue an excessively risky strategy in order to rescue a firm
from insolvency. Adler, Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, supra note 1, at 590. Adler's model
only applies to corporations that are in fact insolvent (although he indicates it might be extended to
solvent firms), see id. at 602 & n.97, and thus is not relevant to understanding the incentives governing
distressed, solvent corporations, which are discussed in this Article.
37 See Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects, supra note 1, at 1173-75 (asserting that golden parachutes
may eliminate this bias to some extent); cf LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 1,
at 710 n.157.
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sequently, a variety of circumstances, in addition to those addressed in Part
II, present incentives contrary to those contemplated by the "overinvest-
ment" theory.
In analyzing whether the "overinvestment" theory identifies in-
centives that dominate the other incentives discussed above, and thus
whether bankruptcy law or corporation law should be revised to ameliorate
those incentives, it is sensible to review empirical evidence of the actions
that distressed debtors actually take. If corporations engage in increased
risk-taking before bankruptcy, that fact would indicate that the incentives
presented by the "overinvestment" theory dominate. If, on the other hand,
corporations do not engage in excessive risk-taking before bankruptcy, that
fact would support concluding that some factors-the theoretical refine-
ments articulated in this Article or those factors previously addressed by
others-limit distressed firms' risk-taking. This Part reviews recent em-
pirical evidence addressing risk-taking by distressed firms.
A survey of forty-one firms reorganized or liquidated in bank-
ruptcy found that only forty-six percent (i.e., nineteen out of forty-one) had
"made acquisitions or started new ventures" in the five years preceding
bankruptcy.38 This information estimates the upper bound of excessive
risk-taking. For the remaining fifty-four percent of the firms, it is clear
they did not initiate excessively risky new lines, because during that five
year period they entered no new lines at all. Only a portion of the forty-six
percent that entered new lines undertook excessively risky expansions-
which portion is not currently known. This evidence undermines the belief
that a firm's proximity to insolvency exacerbates the incentives created by
the issuance of debt to an extent requiring a shift in the fiduciary duties of
directors of nearly insolvent corporations. 39
Most recently, Andrade and Kaplan examined thirty-one firms that
engaged in highly leveraged transactions (management buy-outs or lever-
38 See Daigle & Maloney, supra note 11, at 183. Those authors included in their sample firms
reported in the Wall Street Journal as filing for bankruptcy or reorganizing since 1979, which was
reduced to the subset of firms for which "detailed information about [the] confirmed reorganization
plans" was available. Id at 168. Four of the 41 firms were liquidated, only one of which engaged in
new lines. See id. at 170-71 tbl.1, 184-85 tbl.8. (The above information is based on tables in Daigle &
Maloney, supra note 11. The accompanying textual description of the information in those tables
overstates by one the number of firms that were liquidated, relative to those firms identified in those
tables as having liquidated. See id. at 168.)
39 A portfolio's beta measures the relationship between the returns of the portfolio and market
returns, measuring the portfolio's nondiversifiable risk. See ARTHUR J. KEOWAN ET AL., BAsic
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 220 (7th ed. 1996). A beta greater than one indicates that the portfolio's
nondiversifiable risk is greater than that of the market. See id. at 221.
Daigle and Maloney find that firms that ultimately become bankrupt have an estimated port-
folio beta of 1.4, from which the authors conclude that the firms that ultimately become bankrupt
"have found a way to redirect the behavior of the firm toward high variance projects as a way of ex-
propriating the bondholder wealth," although they note that alternative explanations are available.
Daigle & Maloney, supra note 11, at 186.
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aged recapitalizations) and subsequently became financially distressed.40
No evidence was found indicating that one or more firms had engaged in
unusually risky ventures.4'
For some debtors-those with directors having small equity hold-
ings in the firm and focusing on entrenchment-the incentives identified
by the "overinvestment" theory have decreased force. In these situations,
the assumption that management acts on behalf of the shareholders may be
questionable. The debtors in Andrade and Kaplan's survey are particularly
appropriate for applying the "overinvestment" theory to distressed firms.
Seventy-four of the debtors had been the subject of a buyout involving
management or a controlling shareholder.42 For these debtors, the circum-
stances imply that the interests of the shareholders and those of the manag-
ers were closely aligned. Nevertheless, no debtor was observed engaging
in excessively risky transactions.
Evidence concerning the causes of corporate bankruptcies further
supports concluding that excessive risk-taking by distressed firms actually
occurs in limited circumstances. If excessive risk-taking occurred in prac-
tice, one would expect unwarranted expansion or other managerial blun-
ders would be a prominent cause of business bankruptcies. However, a
survey of firms for which information was publicly available indicates that
other factors cause firms to become bankrupt. Only eight percent of all
bankruptcies surveyed identified ambitious expansion as one of the causes
of bankruptcy, and in only eight percent were various managerial blunders
identified as causes.43 That is, in at least 84% of the cases, managerial ac-
tions of these types played no part. The primary causes were an inability to
obtain financing (31%), a liquidity/cash flow shortage (27%), and an in-
dustry/market slump (26%).' Furthermore, because managerial blunders
and ambitious expansion may not have been entirely caused by attempts to
engage in excessively risky activity, for the vast majority of bankruptcies,
excessive risk-taking was not a factor in the respective firm's demise.45
40 Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not Economic) Distress?
Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions That Became Distressed (July 1997) (preliminary
unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
41 See id. at 18.
42 See id. app. .
43 See Sudip Datta & Mai E. Iskandar-Datta, Reorganization and Financial Distress: An Em-
pirical Investigation, 43 J. FiN. RES. 15, 18 tbl.1 (1995). More than one cause may be attributed to a
bankruptcy, so the number as to which either was a cause may be less than 16%. The sample for the
study includes the 135 firms that filed petitions in Chapter 11 during the 1980s for which the relevant
data were available. See id. at 17. The causes of bankruptcy reported in the survey were "provided by
management and analysts for bankruptcy in the [Wall Street Journal]." Id.
44 See id. at l8 tbl.l.
45 One could argue that excessive risk-taking could have been the reason underlying the bank-
ruptcy of firms, where the respondents identified as a cause either "unable to obtain financing" or
"liquidity/cash flow shortage," because entering into excessively risky projects would ultimately cause
a bankruptcy through a process that involved a cash flow shortage for which the debtor could not
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The notion that firms that ultimately become insolvent do not en-
gage in excessively risky acquisitions or business expansions while in dis-
tress is further supported by a recent review of the effect on the stock price
of such firms arising from announcements of acquisitions or other business
expansions. Khanna and Poulsen examined 128 public firms that filed for
protection under Chapter 11 from 1980 through 1990, and prepared a con-
trol sample of 118 firms similar in size and industry to the 128 firms that
ultimately filed for bankruptcy protection.46 Only nineteen of the 128 firms
that ultimately filed under Chapter 11, or fifteen percent, announced an
acquisition or expansion in the three years preceding the Chapter 11 filing
(compared to twenty-nine percent of the control sample).47 Khanna and
Poulsen found no statistically significant effect on the stock price of those
firms that ultimately filed under Chapter 11 arising from those acquisition
or expansion announcements.48 If these firms were engaged in acquisitions
or expansions that stock market participants could identify as excessively
risky, those announcements should have resulted in a statistically signifi-
cant effect on the stock price. The absence of statistically significant re-
turns in this context thus is consistent with the conclusion that excessive
risk-taking is not substantially exacerbated by financial distress.
Based in part on some of the issues discussed above, and in part on
the uncertain application of corporate fiduciary duties, discussed in Part
IV.E, one group of commentators concluded, "The agents' lack of aware-
ness about the firm's changed financial status, coupled with the shifting
nature of the agents' fiduciary duty, makes any meaningful economic
analysis of the agents' incentives virtually impossible. 49
The empirical evidence surveyed in this Part strongly supports the
conclusion that distressed corporations do not engage in the excessive risk-
taking predicted by the "overinvestment" theory. Surveys of firms that
become bankrupt or distressed do not identify prior excessive risk-taking.
The evidence appears particularly compelling in a circumstance where
managers' interests are closely aligned with those of the shareholders. The
absence of adverse stock price reactions to announcements of expansions
or acquisitions by firms that ultimately become bankrupt suggests that the
stock market does not identify those expansions or acquisitions as exces-
obtain additional financing. That construction would not be reasonable, however. Virtually any insol-
vency could be prevented with an increase in cash flow or greater access to capital. A more reasonable
construction of the responses is that insolvency was attributed to a cash flow shortage or an inability to
obtain financing only where another more specific cause, such as a managerial blunder in engaging in
excessive risk-taking, could not be identified.
46 Naveen Khanna & Annette B. Poulsen, Managers of Financially Distressed Firms: Villains
or Scapegoats?, 50 J. FIN. 919, 924-25 (1995).
47 See id. at 928 tbl.IU.
48 Id. at 929, 930 tbl.IV.
49 Ramesh K.S. Rao et al., Fiduciary Duty a la Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on Corpo-
rate Governance in a Financially-Distressed Firm, 22 J. CORP. L. 53, 64 (1996).
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sively risky. This empirical evidence thus supports the argument in Part II
that the "overinvestment" theory does not accurately predict actions taken
by distressed firms. Analyses of the incentives presented to distressed cor-
porations by federal bankruptcy law premised on the "overinvestment"
theory are founded on a questionable assumption.
Two recent cases, building on the controversial Delaware Chan-
cery Court opinion in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Commu-
nications Corp.,50 have construed corporation law in a fashion that creates
substantial incentives that may dominate over any other incentives pre-
sented by federal bankruptcy law to managers of distressed, solvent corpo-
rations. Part IV turns to the background of those cases.
IV. APPLICABLE CORPORATION LAW PRINCIPLES
A. Insolvent Firms
A traditional economic justification for the proposition that corpo-
rations typically are managed for the benefit of the shareholders is that
shareholders are the owners of the residual value of the firm.5' Where a
corporation is insolvent, and the creditors in fact bear the risk of decreases
in the residual value of the corporation, the traditional justification for
promoting exclusively the shareholders' interests disappears.52 This fact,
and the variations in incentives that arise as a firm approaches
insolvency, 53 are reflected in changes in a board of directors' fiduciary
duties. The majority rule, and the law in Delaware, is that, upon insol-
vency, a board's duties are owed to the creditors of the enterprise. 54
50 Civil Action No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
51 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 67-70 (1991); see also Gilson & Vetsuypens, supra note 20, at 1005-06.
52 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 51, at 69; Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Cor-
poration's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOzO L. REv. 647, 667-68 (1996) (describing creditors of
insolvent firms as having "equity-type rights").
53 See supra Part I.
54 See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939) (stating, in holding that a bankruptcy court
may disallow as a claim a fraudulently obtained judgement in favor of the controlling stockholder,
"While normally that fiduciary obligation [of a director] is enforceable directly by the corporation, or
through a stockholder's derivative action, it is, in the event of bankruptcy of the corporation, enforce-
able by the trustee. For that standard of fiduciary obligation is designed for the protection of the entire
community of interests in the corporation-creditors as well as stockholders." (footnotes omitted));
Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Debtor STN Enters., Inc. v. Noyes (In re STN Enters.), 779 F.2d 901,
904-05 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Thus, the 'majority rule' permits recovery by creditors of an insolvent corpo-
ration for mismanagement as if the corporation itself were plaintiff, while the 'minority rule' precludes
suit by injured creditors of an insolvent corporation, although a suit for misappropriation or diversion
of corporate property may stand on different and more solid footing." (citations and footnote omitted));
American Nat'l Bank v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266,
1269, 1277 (5th Cir. 1983); FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cit. 1982) (stating,
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There is some controversy concerning whether the existence of
such a duty owed directly to creditors has a strong basis in traditional ju-
risprudence. The "trust fund doctrine" is the seminal theory.55 Under this
doctrine, as originally formulated, creditors could pursue remedies against
holders of assets improperly distributed by debtor corporations.
"when the corporation becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the stockhold-
ers to the creditors," and quoting a case to the effect that the shift arises "when a corporation becomes
insolvent, or in a failing condition" (quoting Davis v. Woolf, 147 F.2d 629, 633 (4th Cir. 1945)));
Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981); Bank Leumi-Le-Israel, Philadelphia
Branch v. Sunbelt Indus., Inc., 485 F. Supp. 556, 559 (S.D. Ga. 1980) (stating that the directors and
officers of an insolvent corporation "stand as trustees of corporate properties for the benefit of credi-
tors first and stockholders second"); Committee of the Creditors of Xonics Med. Sys., Inc. v. Haverty
(In re Xonics, Inc.), 99 B.R. 870, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (stating, under Delaware law, "When a
corporation is insolvent its officers and directors stand in a position of trust not only to the corporation
and its shareholders, but also to its creditors."); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787
(Del. Ch. 1992) ("[N]either party seriously disputes that when the insolvency exception does arise, it
creates fiduciary duties for directors for the benefit of creditors."); accord 3A WILLIAM MEADE
FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § § 1182, 1185
(perm. ed. rev. vol. 1994) (stating that the general rule is that creditors of an insolvent corporation may
bring an action to enforce the fiduciary obligations of directors, at least where the corporation has
declined to bring the action, and the proper theoretical basis is that directors are liable to the corpora-
tion as a result of any breach of their obligations, "which may be enforced in equity, as other equitable
assets may be collected, for the purpose of satisfying the claims of creditors").
Although the above states the traditional rule, some courts hold otherwise. See 3A FLETCHER
ET AL., supra, §§ 1175, 1181, at 427 ("The minority rule is that creditors of [insolvent] corporations
cannot, in general, maintain an action against directors for default in duty owed to the corporation,
although the creditors may be injured as a result. In other words, some courts hold that mere creditors
of an insolvent bank or other corporation cannot sue, even in equity, to hold the directors or other
officers liable for losses due to mere negligence, unless so provided by statute.... on the ground that
there is no trust relation between the officers and creditors.").
LoPucki and Whitford argue that the "better view" is that fiduciary duties are owed to both
shareholders and creditors of insolvent corporations, which, the authors assert, implies, "the law of
fiduciary duty does not provide a reliable way for either creditors or shareholders to check manage-
ment when it acts in an otherwise appropriate manner on matters with regard to which the interests of
creditors and shareholders conflict." LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at
709.
Lin asserts, "All of the decisions in which the courts have allowed creditors to recover for
breach of fiduciary duty have involved directors of an insolvent corporation diverting corporate assets
for the benefit of insiders or preferred creditors." Lin, supra note 11, at 1513. Although the litigated
cases have involved factual patterns that she can categorize in that fashion, that pattern does not mean
that the rule is limited to that paradigm, where the language of the cases themselves does not express
that limitation. Additionally, any transaction by an insolvent firm, which transaction could be charac-
terized as excessive risk-taking, would meet the pattern identified by Lin, where the directors and
officers had a significant equity interest in the debtor.
Coffee raises the interesting question of whether the existence of this fiduciary duty to credi-
tors should cause issuer repurchases of debt securities by nearly insolvent issuers to be subject to
fiduciary duties. Coffee, supra note 8.
55 See Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., Does a Corporation's Board of Directors Owe a Fiduciary
Duty to Its Creditors?, 25 ST. MARY's L.J. 589, 594 (1994); Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexamining
the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors' Duties to
Creditors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 87-89 (1995); Stephen R. McDonnell, Comment, Geyer v. Ingersoll
Publications Co.: Insolvency Shifts Directors' Burden from Shareholders to Creditors, 19 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 177, 186-87 (1994).
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Thus, in Wood v. Dummer, the court held that a bank's capital
stock cannot be withdrawn prior to payment of all debts, because the
capital stock is "deemed a pledge or trust fund for payment of the debts
contracted by the bank."56 And courts subsequently held that when a cor-
poration is insolvent and has ceased to do business, creditors have standing
to maintain an action for a director's breach of a fiduciary duty.57
Permitting creditors to pursue remedies against holders of assets
improperly distributed by a debtor corporation does not necessarily require
that such creditors have the right to participate in, or oversee, the manage-
ment of the business of an insolvent corporation. Nor does it require that
such creditors have a right to bring an action against the directors for fail-
ing to pursue strategies believed to be in creditors' best interest. Notwith-
standing academic criticism, 58 courts have held that certain transactions by
insolvent corporations not in the process of liquidating may be considered
to violate an enforceable duty to creditors. 9
B. Corporations in the Vicinity of Insolvency
In Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications
Corp.,' the Delaware Chancery Court created a third, intermediate stan-
dard-when a corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency, the corpora-
tion's board of directors' duty of loyalty is owed to the corporate enter-
prise as a whole. The court stated:
At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors
is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enter-
prise ....
... [Un managing the business affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insol-
vency, circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to
follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the credi-
tors, or the employees, or any single group interested in the corporation) would make if
given the opportunity to act.
... [T]he [issuer] board or its executive committee had an obligation to the commu-
nity of interest that sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in an informed, good
faith effort to maximize the corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity.
61
56 Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435,436 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944).
57 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
58 See Beveridge, supra note 55, at 592 (stating that the doctrine was never intended to create
such duties); Stilson, supra note 55, at 87 (describing the trust fund doctrine as "superfluous" to the
decision in Wood v. Dummer). Attempting to determine whether a fiduciary duty should be owed to
creditors directly, based on whether such a holding was necessary to decide a corporation law case
heard in the early 1800s, is a curious exercise.
59 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
60 Civil Action No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
61 Id. at *108-*109 & n.55. Roe foreshadowed this holding. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and
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That is, the directors are to disregard conflicting incentives of the various
claimants and must not to attempt to promote the interests of one group at
the expense of another. In reaching this holding, the court relied on the
"overinvestment" theory.62
Credit Lyonnais did not clearly address whether the duties articu-
lated in the case are affirmatively enforceable by creditors, i.e., whether
creditors of a distressed corporation can bring a lawsuit against the direc-
tors for pursuing business strategies that do not promote the firm's long-
term wealth creating capacity. The case could be read as merely granting
directors of distressed corporations an additional basis on which they could
defend against lawsuits filed on behalf of disgruntled shareholders. This
Article argues that the former interpretation is a more fair reading of the
case; that reading also is consistent with recent case law. The rationale for
that interpretation of Credit Lyonnais relies in part on other case law-the
law governing directors of solvent corporations in choosing time horizons
by which possible strategies are to be judged. Part IV.C discusses that case
law. Part IV.D then discusses the duties of directors of distressed corpora-
tions under corporation law.63
C. Time Horizon
Corporation law generally provides that a corporation's directors,
and officers appointed by directors, are delegated the responsibility for
managing the corporation, with shareholder participation in management
generally excluded. 64 The court in Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time Inc. held that one of those delegated aspects of managing a solvent
business is deciding upon the appropriate investment horizon.65
Paramount arose out of a transaction that was originally structured
as a merger of Warner Communication, Inc., into a subsidiary of Time
Incorporated. Shares of Warner would have been converted into shares of
Time Incorporated.66 Had the transaction been consummated on those
Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganizations, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 583 (1983) (discussing
the incentives of a firm on the brink of insolvency, and stating "[tihis problem might be avoided by a
concept of corporate duty of officers and directors to the abstract firm, not just to its shareholders").
62 Credit Lyonnais, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55.
63 The discussion of corporation law in the remainder of this Article is restricted to Delaware
corporation law.
64 See Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in
Corporate Governance: Too Little, but Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 388-89, 394, 456-57
(1994); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to
Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 348-49 (1991).
65 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990). At the time
of the transaction in question in Paramount, the author was employed by outside counsel that repre-
sented Time in the transaction, although the author did not participate in that representation.
66 Id. at 1146.
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terms, former shareholders of Warner would have owned approximately
62% of Time. Paramount subsequently made an unsolicited offer to pur-
chase all outstanding shares of Time Incorporated at $175 per share, in
cash, conditioned on, inter alia, the termination of the Time-Warner trans-
action.67 Time's stock price rose from $126 to $170 on the following day.68
In response, the Time-Warner transaction was restructured, with Time
making an offer to purchase 51% of Warner for $70 in cash, the remaining
shares of Warner to be purchased for a combination of cash and stock at a
later time.69 Paramount then raised its offer to purchase Time shares to
$200 per share. Time rejected Paramount's offer, and Paramount filed suit
to enjoin the tender offer for Warner by Time .70 The trial court found that
Time's Board of Directors expected that the short-term return of the ini-
tially contemplated transaction would be less than that of Paramount's
offer:
[T]he board understood that it was foreclosing for the present ... the option for Time
shareholders to realize $175 cash for their shares-indeed it understood that $175 could be
realized from [Paramount's CEO] and perhaps substantially more from him or others and,
more significantly, the board understood that immediately following the effectuation of a
Warner merger, the stock market price of Time stock was likely to be materially lower than
the $175 then "on the table," perhaps $150, but more likely, within the wide range of $106-
$188."
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court stated, "Delaware law
confers the management of the corporate enterprise to the stockholders'
duly elected board of representatives. The fiduciary duty to manage a cor-
porate enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for achievement of
corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated to the stockholders. 72
This distinction might be problematic for some. One could argue
that the current market price of a firm's stock should reflect the value of all
long-term strategies to be pursued. Therefore, if a firm adopts a long-term
strategy at the expense of short-term returns, but with correspondingly
greater long-term return, that strategy should create a higher current mar-
ket price for the firm's stock than alternative strategies having lesser long-
term returns. The notion that management has the authority to select the
time horizon, at least for public corporations required to disclose all mate-
rial information, therefore could be seen as conflicting with the view that
67 See id. at 1147.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 1148.
70 See id. at 1142, 1148.
71 Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., Civil Action Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935 (Con-
solidated), 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at *53 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989) (citation omitted), aft'd, 571 A.2d
1140 (Del. 1989). The opinion implies that Time's board did not believe that it was obligated to con-
summate a transaction with Warner until it restructured the transaction with Warner after the initial
$175 per share offer for Time was made. See id. at *47.
72 Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154 (citation omitted).
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market prices for common stock accurately reflect all currently available
information. This distinction nevertheless is permissible in the field of
corporation law.73
Similarly, in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., in the con-
text of determining the reasonableness of a stock repurchase program, the
court stated, "[D]istinctions among types of shareholders are neither inap-
propriate nor irrelevant for a board of directors to make, e.g., distinctions
between long-term shareholders and short-term profit-takers, such as arbi-
trageurs, and their stockholding objectives. 74
73 An extract from the chancery court opinion in Paramount explains the rationale in detail:
The legal analysis that follows treats the distinction that the Time board implicitly
drew between current share value maximization and long-term share value maxi-
mization. For some, this is a false distinction. "The lawyers may talk about a pre-
mium for control. But to a true believer of efficient markets, there cannot be a
premium for control." Therefore, before turning to the legal analysis that does em-
ploy that distinction, I pause to address in some brief way the notion that the dis-
tinction between any long-term and short-term stock value, at least where there is
a large, active, informed market for the shares of the company, is an error; that the
nature of such markets is precisely to discount to a current value the future finan-
cial prospects of the firm; and that markets with their numberless participants
seeking information and making judgments do this correctly (at least in the limited
sense that no one without inside information can regularly do it better).
This view may be correct. It may be that in a well-developed stock market,
there is no discount for long-term profit maximizing behavior except that reflected
in the discount for the time value of money. It may be the case that when the mar-
ket valued the stock of Time at about $125 per share following the announcement
of the merger, an observer blessed with perfect foresight would have concurred in
that value now of the future stream of all returns foreseen into eternity. Perhaps
wise social policy and sound business decisions ought to be premised upon the as-
sumptions that underlie that view. But just as the Constitution does not enshrine
Mr. Herbert Spencer's social statics, neither does the common law of directors'
duties elevate the theory of a single, efficient capital market to the dignity of a sa-
cred text.
Directors may operate on the theory that the stock market valuation is "wrong"
in some sense, without breaching faith with shareholders. No one, after all, has
access to more information concerning the corporation's present and future condi-
tion. It is far from irrational and certainly not suspect for directors to believe that
a likely immediate market valuation of the Time-Warner merger will undervalue
the stock. The record in this case refers to instances in which directors did func-
tion on a theory that they understood better than the public market for the firm's
shares what the value of their firm was, and were shown by events to be cor-
rect....
On the level of legal doctrine, it is clear that under Delaware law, directors are
under no obligation to act so as to maximize the immediate value of the corpora-
tion or its shares, except in the special case in which the corporation is in a "Rev-
lon mode." Thus, Delaware law does recognize that directors, when acting deliber-
ately, in an informed way, and in the good faith pursuit of corporate interests, may
follow a course designed to achieve long-term value even at the cost of immediate
value maximization.
Paramount, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at *55-*58 (citations and footnotes omitted).
74 Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386 (Del. 1995).
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D. Persons Who May Assert the Obligation
This background illuminates the meaning of the duties of directors
of distressed corporations created in Credit Lyonnais. Credit Lyonnais may
be read as creating an obligation to stakeholders who are not shareholders
that those stakeholders can enforce.75 In the alternative, Credit Lyonnais
may merely be permissive-it may permit directors of nearly insolvent
corporations to consider interests whose consideration otherwise would be
improper under otherwise applicable fiduciary duty of loyalty require-
ments.
In Credit Lyonnais, the court upheld decisions by management
that conflicted with the desires of the majority stockholder. Whether
creditors may assert a cause of action alleging a violation of this duty
therefore was not presented in Credit Lyonnais. The same Chancellor who
wrote the opinion in Credit Lyonnais in a subsequent case summarized
Credit Lyonnais as follows:
[Where foreseeable financial effects of a board decision may importantly fall upon credi-
tors as well as holders of common stock, as where [the] corporation is in the vicinity of in-
solvency, an independent board may consider impacts upon all corporate constituencies in
exercising its good faith business judgment for [the] benefit of the "corporation"... 76
The Chancellor's summary suggests Credit Lyonnais does not cre-
ate a duty that creditors can enforce affirmatively. Yet one district court
presented with the issue held that such an affirmatively enforceable duty
exists.77 And another court, citing Credit Lyonnais, held that a director of a
corporation that was on "the brink of insolvency" was a "trustee of the
75 Credit Lyonnais was read in this fashion in Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: "Deriva-
tive Reality" and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 TEx. L. REv. 985, 1029 (1995),
and Rima Fawal Hartman, Note, Situation-Specific Fiduciary Duties for Corporate Directors: En-
forceable Obligations or Toothless Ideals?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1761, 1764 (1993). This Article
provides a more detailed analysis of that issue, further supporting those opinions, and provides new
case authority supporting that conclusion.
But Sparks, a prominent practitioner, draws a different conclusion:
Significantly, footnote 55 [of Credit Lyonnais] does not create a direct fiduciary
duty running from directors to creditors, with the result that creditors cannot sue
directly to enforce a director's breach of footnote 55 duties to the corporate enter-
prise. Presumably, however, a trustee in bankruptcy would have standing to sue
on behalf of the bankrupt estate to recover from directors for willful or grossly
negligent breaches of footnote 55 duties.
A. Gilchrist Sparks, 111, Fiduciary Duties of Financially Troubled Delaware Corporations, 1 26TH
ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 759, 784-85 (1994). Sparks notes, however, "[it could be argued that the
direct cause of action by creditors against directors of insolvent corporations sanctioned by Geyer also
extends to a violation of footnote 55 duties." Id. at 792.
76 Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1997) (emphasis
added).
77 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance Capital Group,
Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178 B.R. 956, 968 (D. Del. 1994).
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corporation with the res being the corporate assets. 78 These two opinions
thus clarify that, at least in these courts, the duties owed by directors of
solvent, distressed corporations can be affirmatively enforced by creditors.
The nature of the duty created by Credit Lyonnais and the context of that
opinion provide perspective to an understanding of whether other courts
can be expected to reach similar holdings.
As discussed in Part IV.C, supra, while directors are obligated to
manage a corporation for the benefit of the shareholders, directors are not
required to exercise that managerial power in compliance with all unambi-
guously expressed desires of the shareholders. Shareholders in that cir-
cumstance need to remove the directors in order to have their policies pur-
sued.
If the opinion in Credit Lyonnais contemplated a duty that could
not be enforced against directors, the discussion of the incentives created
when firms issue debt would have been unnecessary. This aspect of the
case could have been resolved by simply discussing settled principles un-
der which managers need not follow the unambiguously expressed desires
of their constituencies. As Credit Lyonnais references these incentives, the
opinion clearly suggests that an allegedly aggrieved non-shareholder who
nevertheless is a corporate constituent can affirmatively enforce the duties.
This reading of Credit Lyonnais is further supported by the fact
that the opinion specifies the time frame of the wealth creating capacity
that is to be maximized. As discussed in Part IV.C of this Article, the
Delaware Supreme Court in Paramount79 held that the determination of
the appropriate time horizon by which strategies are to be judged is dele-
gated to management.8 ° Paramount was decided in 1990, before the 1991
decision in Credit Lyonnais. Therefore, the discussion of a time horizon in
the Credit Lyonnais opinion 81 only has meaning if it is intended to exclude
78 Miramar Resources, Inc. v. Shultz (In re Shultz), 208 B.R. 723, 729 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
The language of that case is somewhat confusing. The quoted language is part of a discussion of the
trust fund doctrine. However, the quote continues, "the beneficiaries being the other directors and the
shareholders, and the affirmative duties being to act in the best interest of the corporation, including
the other directors and shareholders." Id. at 729. That discussion is not consistent with the traditional
application of the trust fund doctrine, in which the creditors are the beneficiaries. See supra notes 55-
57 and accompanying text. The failure of the court to mention creditors is therefore somewhat odd.
But as the trust fund doctrine is a theory that permits a direct action against the directors, this case
supports the notion that the duty created by Credit Lyonnais is one that can be enforced against a
director, i.e., subject him to personal liability.
79 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). Varallo and
Finkelstein draw a parallel between Time and Credit Lyonnais, noting that in both, the board can act in
a fashion contrary to the expressed interests of the shareholders. Gregory V. Varallo & Jesse A.
Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the Financially Troubled Company, 48 Bus. LAW.
239, 243 n.15 (1992).
80 Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154.
81 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civil Action No. 12150,
1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215. at *108-*109 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30. 1991).
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a reference to another time horizon, i.e., shorter time horizons. Since
Paramount generally grants directors the authority to select the relevant
time horizon, including shorter time horizons, Credit Lyonnais limits the
discretion otherwise available to the board. For that limitation to have any
effect, someone must have the right to bring an action against the corpora-
tion or the board in the event the requirements of this limitation are not
followed by the directors.
What types of constituents would have the right to bring an action
asserting a violation of this duty? Credit Lyonnais creates a rule intended
to address the concern that directors may excessively promote the interests
of shareholders, which means the persons who assert this right necessarily
will not be the shareholders.
The rationale behind Credit Lyonnais strongly supports the con-
clusion, expressed in other judicial opinions, that creditors have the right
to bring a cause of action against directors, alleging a corporation's direc-
tors failed to promote the creditors' interests when the corporation was
nearly insolvent.
E. Incentives for Directors of Distressed Corporations Created by
Corporation Law; Impact on Financial Advisors
The duty of directors of corporations operating in the vicinity of
insolvency to maximize the corporation's long-term wealth creating ca-
pacity imposes an obligation that is very difficult to fulfill. Current case
law does not provide clear authority for permitting a waiver of the duty to
be enforced.82 Moreover, under current law, the nature of the duty makes it
unlikely that potential personal liability can be limited by insurance.83 This
Article now discusses these concerns.
The difficulty in satisfying the obligation arises from its ambigu-
ity. Whether one defines insolvency as an excess of liabilities over assets
or as an inability to pay debts generally as they become due,' application
of these definitions in a particular factual pattern may be difficult, and
reasonable individuals may reach different conclusions.85 Difficulties in
determining when a corporation is "in the vicinity of insolvency" are com-
pounded by uncertainty as to the proper accounting treatment of write-offs
82 See infra notes 103-14 and accompanying text.
83 See infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
84 See supra note 10.
85 See Hu, supra note 75, at 1029; McDonnell, supra note 55, at 196, 206; see, e.g., Askanase v.
Fatjo, Civil Action No. H-91-3140, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7911, at *2, *16-*19 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22,
1993) (stating that the evidence was in "equipoise" concerning whether the debtor was insolvent at a
particular time, where amounts paid to a defendant, which was beneficially owned by a former director
of the debtor, could be recovered, under the trust fund doctrine, if the debtor had been insolvent at that
time).
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86during reorganizations. A firm may retroactively restate its balance sheet
after seeking bankruptcy protection, resulting in write-offs that cause a
formerly positive shareholders' equity to become negative. Commentators
have argued that this fact implies that managers "may well be unaware that
the corporation is 'in the vicinity of insolvency' or has crossed the thresh-
old and entered the realm of insolvency. "87
But the standard announced in Credit Lyonnais creates uncertainty
of entirely different dimensions, compared to the uncertainty in deciding
whether a corporation is insolvent. The court did not even announce an
imprecise test as to when a corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency. In
Credit Lyonnais itself there was a dispute concerning whether the corpora-
tion was insolvent under the much more clear bankruptcy insolvency stan-
dard.8 If uncertainty necessarily exists as to whether a corporation's fi-
nancial position meets a well-articulated test--one of the multiple defini-
tions of insolvency-this uncertainty is compounded as to whether a cor-
poration's financial position meets an imprecise test.
89
The ambiguity inherent in these developing corporation law stan-
dards is not limited to the definition of "vicinity of insolvency." The ob-
jective announced in Credit Lyonnais is maximizing the firm's "wealth
creating capacity." As in any such formulation, the meaning of "wealth" is
not self-evident. 90 The indeterminacy of "wealth" cannot be ameliorated
by substituting "net income," because that criterion also is not necessarily
deterministic9' and finance theorists have previously rejected that metric
86 See Roberts, supra note 10, at 288.
87 Rao et al., supra note 49, at 64.
88 Certain creditors had filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition, Credit Lyonnais Bank Neder-
land v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civil Action No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *30 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 30, 1991), which was subsequently dismissed. See id. at *108.
89 McDonnell criticized the imposition of personal liability on directors of insolvent corpora-
tions for failure to promote the interests of directors, as contemplated by Geyer v. Ingersoll Publica-
tions Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992), on similar grounds. McDonnell, supra note 55, at 206-07.
He concludes that the imposition of this liability may cause directors more frequently to fail to act
prior to insolvency, and this rule may accelerate the time when management files for bankruptcy pro-
tection, to assure the identity of the group whose interests management is to promote. See id. Stilson
similarly argues that Credit Lyonnais will result in "defensive management" of nearly insolvent finns.
Stilson, supra note 55, at 61.
90 Cf Van Der Weide, supra note 17, at 28-29 ("Statutes and case law are silent or at least
unhelpful, however, on the question of what it means for a manager to act in the best interests of the
corporation.").
91 See WALTER T. HARRISON, JR. & CHARLES T. HORNGREN, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 495 (2d
ed. 1992) (noting that the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) allow "a choice among
acceptable accounting methods-in inventory, depreciation and other areas," which can limit compa-
rability of financial statements, and noting that generally accepted accounting principles obligate a
business to disclose any change in accounting methods). See generally Lou R. Kling et al., Summary
of Acquisition Agreements, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779, 809 (1997) (noting that acquisition agreements
typically require that the closing balance sheet and the pre-signing balance sheet be prepared consis-
tently).
One extreme example is provided by Sonitrol Holding Co. v. Marceau Investissements, 607
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for a variety of reasons.92 Additionally, businesses frequently are presented
with strategy options for which returns cannot be quantitatively estimated
without an unjustified expenditure on information. Other strategies' re-
turns can be quantified only through the exercise of business judgment as
to which reasonable businessmen may differ. The court in Equity-Linked
Investors, L.P. v. Adams was presented with precisely such a problem, and
did not attempt to make its own determination of value. 93 Only in rare cir-
cumstances will a court be presented with analyzing a business strategy
capable of reduction to precise probabilities.
94
Thus, even if "wealth" references profits determined in accordance
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"), consistently
applied, a court frequently would be unable independently to assess
whether a particular decision made by directors maximized "wealth." The
A.2d 1177 (Del. 1992), in which a seller sought to avoid complying with certain provisions in a stock
and note purchase agreement adverse to the seller, which were triggered if certain projections were not
met. See id. at 1178. The method unsuccessfully adopted by the seller consisted of first changing the
basis on which financial statements were prepared from U.S. GAAP to United Kingdom generally
accepted accounting principles and second preparing financial statements complying with U.S. GAAP
but based on different asset amortization periods than were used in the projections.
92 Frankfurter recounts the following reasons why finance theory discusses maximizing
"wealth," as opposed to "profits":
[T]he innovators of the field [of finance] argued that profits are a bad thing to
maximize, because:
(i) they are defined by accounting principles that are historical, and any correspon-
dence between historical and future performance is incidental at best, nonexistent at
worst;
(ii) accounting data are subject to measurement error of several sources;
(iii) profits are a short-term measure;
(iv) profits can and will be manipulated by management; and (the most compelling
argument of all),
(v) no one can sell an asset at a price higher than what the market will pay for it, re-
gardless of what accounting data show.
George M. Frankfurter, Is a Misconception a Paradox?, 1 EUR. J. FIN. 31, 32 (1995).
Formerly, courts not burdened with these theoretical distinctions were able to state the goals of
management more succinctly:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end,
and does not extend to a change in the end itself ....
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (emphasis added), quoted in Van Der
Weide, supra note 17, at 29 n.7.
93 Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1058-59 (Del. Ch. 1997).
94 Dwyer v. Jones (In re Tri-State Paving, Inc.), 32 B.R. 2 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982), is an
anomalous example of a strategy that may be capable of reduction to probabilities. It involved officers
who withdrew all the funds the debtor had in its bank account and gambled it all in Las Vegas "to win
enough money ... to pay the corporate-debtor's creditors." Id. at 3. The strategy was unsuccessful.
See id. at 4-5. Of course, it is unlikely that a reported case would involve managers who successfully
adopted such a strategy. Yet such a strategy may be beneficial for creditors. See Lin, supra note 11, at
1491 n.19 (reporting that the founder of Federal Express successfully adopted such a strategy during a
period of financial difficulty).
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ambiguity as to the definition of "wealth" thus creates additional uncer-
tainty.
Even more problematic is the test's ambiguity regarding the extent
to which the firm's capital structure is incorporated in the wealth assess-
ment. That is, the opinion does not resolve the level of abstraction at which
the "wealth creating capacity" is judged. A firm's capital structure may
affect its ability to pursue various strategies. Access to capital may require
incurring transaction costs that vary depending on the firm's current capi-
tal structure.
Consider, for example, a creditor's opportunity to extract a pay-
ment from a debtor in exchange for waiving a default under a financial
covenant, discussed above.95 Outcomes involving those payments raise
difficult questions concerning how one determines the return to the rele-
vant constituencies from various strategies. If a nearly insolvent firm pays
a creditor in exchange for not accelerating below-market rate indebtedness,
that payment could be considered a cost, in which case those strategies that
include outcomes involving such payments would have to reflect the
amount of the payment as a cost. In the alternative, such a payment could
merely be a redistribution among relevant stakeholders, in which case the
payment would not be considered to be a cost.96
The Credit Lyonnais court created a variation in the fiduciary du-
ties arising from financial distress to protect the interests of creditors such
as these lenders. These creditors are members of the "community of inter-
est that sustained the corporation. 97 The language of the opinion address-
ing this fiduciary duty provides no basis for stating that certain returns to
these creditors (or other members of the relevant community) are part of
the corporation's relevant "wealth creating capacity," but other returns,
such as payments made in exchange for a lender not accelerating out-
standing debt, are not.
The "community of interest that sustained the corporation" will
extend beyond those creditors under obligations for money borrowed. For
example, amounts that one normally views as costs to a solvent firm aris-
ing from raising capital, such as accounting fees, are payable to persons
who provide ongoing services to the corporation and who may have ex-
95 See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
96 Cf Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Compensating Unsecured Creditors for Ex-
traordinary Bankruptcy Reorganization Risks, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1133, 1144 (1994) (proposing that
bankrupt firms expressly be required to adopt the investment strategy "that maximizes the company
value, regardless of its distributional effects").
97 Credit Lyonnais involved a shareholder's challenge to the management of the corporation
under a "Corporate Governance Agreement," which was executed at the instigation of a commercial
bank as part of the corporation's receiving additional credit. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe
Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). The
agreement abrogated the typical governance structure of the debtor, divesting a controlling shareholder
of certain power. See id. at *3, *32.
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tended trade credit. A significant portion of the "direct costs" of a corpo-
ration's bankruptcy may well be paid to members of the "community of
interest that sustained the corporation," such as accountants. To the extent
that Credit Lyonnais requires directors of a nearly insolvent firm to accord
a positive value to an outcome in which the corporation becomes a vehicle
for generating fees to creditors, directors would be required to adjust sub-
stantially the manner in which the return to a firm is determined.
The alternative approach would require a nearly insolvent corpo-
ration's directors to consider various corporate strategies without reference
to distributions to third parties, i.e., "costs," created by the firm's specific
capital structure and capitalization. That viewpoint would be consistent
with the view of the firm expressed by Modigliani and Miller.98 Although
such an approach would facilitate judicial review, by diminishing the di-
mensions of the decisions that a court would have to review, it also is un-
satisfactory.
Credit Lyonnais creates a legal rule applicable to firms likely to
become insolvent. Any material cost associated with bankruptcy cannot be
ignored in articulating a rule that addresses the rights of competing claim-
ants in firms with significantly higher than normal likelihoods of becoming
insolvent.
Thus, these developments in corporation law impose an amor-
phous standard. Whether these duties apply to a particular set of directors,
i.e., whether a corporation is "in the vicinity of insolvency," will not nec-
essarily be clear. The extent to which payments to non-shareholder con-
stituencies should be considered as "costs" cannot be determined.
Of course, the law frequently creates vague standards. One reason
for creating vague standards is to deter undesirable conduct.99 However,
inherent in such a rationale is that there is no cause of action where one is,
in fact, deterred. If Credit Lyonnais creates an affirmatively enforceable
duty, directors who attempt to follow its dictates when deciding among
98 Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory ofInvestment, 48 Am. ECON. REv. 261, 268 (1958) ("[T]he market value of any firm is inde-
pendent of its capital structure and is given by capitalizing its expected return at the rate... appropri-
ate to its class."); cf. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 26, at 1154-55 (applying the concept articulated
by Modigliani and Miller to argue that absent monitoring costs, the benefit gained by a debtor arising
from a reduced interest rate paid to secured creditors should exactly offset the increase that other
creditors would charge arising from the granting of a security interest to another creditor). The Modi-
gliani and Miller thesis has gained "general acceptance." Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects, supra note 1, at
1166. Perhaps a more practically oriented view, derived disregarding the firm's capital structure,
would be that a capitalized expected value of the firm's returns forms an upper bound on the firm's
value, although various capital structures may impose material costs, e.g., agency costs, that decrease
the value of the enterprise as a whole by adversely affecting the returns estimated without reference to
those costs.
99 See, e.g., Niels B. Schaumann, The Lender as Unconventional Fiduciary, 23 SETON HALL L.
REv. 21, 31, 45 (1992) (stating that the scope of conduct prohibited by fiduciary duties is vague, to
induce fiduciaries to act conservatively).
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alternative strategies, but fail to predict accurately when a court will de-
termine that a corporation is "operating in the vicinity of insolvency," will
necessarily be subject to liability. If the directors incorrectly believe the
corporation is not "in the vicinity of insolvency," the directors will pro-
mote the shareholders' interest and be subject to liability in an action
brought by creditors. t" If they instead gravitate to promoting the interests
of creditors and the corporation is not "in the vicinity of insolvency," di-
rectors will be subject to liability to the shareholders. If Credit Lyonnais
creates an affirmatively enforceable standard, directors have to be pre-
cisely correct in determining whether the standard is met. This legal
framework imposes extraordinarily powerful economic incentives that can
be expected to affect significantly the actions of managers of nearly insol-
vent firms, and perhaps precipitate managerial defections, to the detriment
of distressed firms.' 0 '
The burden on firms operating in the vicinity of insolvency in that
context would be increased by the possibility that outside professionals,
such as investment banks, that facilitate consummation of transactions
approved by boards of directors also may be subject to liability. An in-
vestment bank that provides substantial assistance in the consummation of
a transaction that the investment bank knows or should know to be in vio-
lation of a board's fiduciary duty aids or abets the board's primary viola-
tion and thus will be liable to the beneficiary of the duty.10 2 The cost of
that risk ultimately will be reflected in fees paid to such professionals by
firms operating in the vicinity of insolvency.
Unenforceability of a Waiver of the Duty. The impact of these in-
centives could be diminished, if a corporation were able to release its di-
rectors from these obligations. However, current law is ambiguous as to
whether the duties of a director to promote the interests of a specified con-
stituency can be released by contract. The fiduciary duty of loyalty re-
quires that directors of solvent corporations promote the interests of the
shareholders. The shifting duties contemplated by Credit Lyonnais repre-
sent refinements of those duties of loyalty. Under corporation law, duties
100 It may be that personal liability to creditors would only arise where the debtor ultimately
became insolvent, due to intricacies of the law of derivative actions. This technical issue moderates
the potential personal liability of directors to a level insufficient to have any material effect on the
undesirable features and consequences of this rule.
101 Cf. Stilson, supra note 55, at 61. Additional evidence of the negative effect on the value of a
firm operating in the vicinity of insolvency arising from increasing the liability risks of directors of the
firm is provided by Brook and Rao. They found a positive reaction in the price of the stock of poorly
performing corporations adopting provisions limiting the liability of officers or directors, but they
found no such reaction for all firms as a whole. See Yaron Brook & Ramesh K. S. Rao, Shareholder
Wealth Effects of Directors' Liability Provisions, 29 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 481, 481
(1994).
102 See Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 195 B.R. 971, 986 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1996).
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of loyalty typically cannot be altered by contract, in the sense that a direc-
tor cannot be relieved of his duty to promote those interests that are pro-
tected by the duty of loyalty. 103 The law in Delaware on this matter seems
rather clear:
[A corporation's] certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all of the following
matters: ... (7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a direc-
tor, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For
any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders .... 104
Moreover, a court has narrowly construed this provision, holding
that it does not permit elimination of liability that would be owed by per-
sons other than directors, i.e., those aiding or abetting a violation. °5
Stilson analyzes the issue by referring to the law pertaining to
limited liability companies. She notes that duties of loyalty owed to Dela-
ware limited liability companies and limited partnerships can be waived. 106
There is no obvious reason for treating limited liability companies and
corporations differently in this context. Nevertheless, Delaware law does
not appear to permit a corporation to waive the right to pursue a director
for a breach of the duty of loyalty. 17 The absence of a clear rationale for
the distinction does not provide a basis for disregarding the language of
controlling a statute.108
103 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1996) (providing that a corporate charter
cannot relieve a director from liability for breaches of a duty of loyalty); FRLK, supra note 10, §
102.14; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV.
211, 250 (1995).
However, Moskowitz and Effross have written: "In 1989, however, a Delaware Chancery
Court implied that a corporation might amend its certificate of incorporation to eliminate or limit
directorial liability when a breach of the duty of loyalty occurs, in contrast to section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware Code." Theodore D. Moskowitz & Walter A. Effross, Turning Back the Tide of Director
and Officer Liability, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 897, 916 (1993). For this proposition, they cite Sieg-
man v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Civil Action No. 9477, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, at *26-*27 (Del. Ch.
May 30, 1989), claims dismissed in part, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 80 (Del. Ch. June 14, 1990), aff'd in
pertinent part and rev'd in part, 634 A.2d 319 (Del. 1993). A portion of the case cited by Moskowitz
and Effross is in conflict with the conclusion that they draw: "Thus, at least one scenario (and perhaps
others) could plausibly be constructed where Article Six would eliminate or would limit the liability of
Tri-Star directors for breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty-a result proscribed by § 102(b)(7)."
Siegman, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, at *26.
104 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (Supp. 1996).
105 In Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 308-09 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1997), the court stated, "The statute's exemption from liability for lack of care extends only to
directors. Section 102(b)(7) [of the Delaware General Corporation Law] purports to grant no protec-
tion to third parties who aid and abet directors in the violation of their obligations of either care or
loyalty."
106 See Stilson, supra note 55, at 7.
107 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(i) (Supp. 1996).
108 Even if one were to decide to disregard the terms of the statutes, in an attempt to harmonize
the provisions applicable to limited liability companies and corporations, this goal provides no basis
for determining which of the two statutory provisions should be disregarded. One could argue with
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A more forceful argument is that the duties owed to creditors upon
insolvency contemplated by Credit Lyonnais present a situation similar to
those involving conflicting claims between two classes of stock. A line of
cases involving multiple classes of stock holds that management can take
actions to the detriment of the holders of preferred stock, to the extent that
the preferred stock has provisions that address in general terms the type of
transaction being taken but do not expressly prevent the consummation of
the particular transaction formulated by the directors. Typical in this line
of cases are HB Korenvaes Investments, L.P. v. Marriott Corp.'09 and
Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Cordant Holdings Corp.10 Those cases
uphold certain contractual provisions that modify fiduciary duties. One
could thus argue that the duties to creditors contemplated by Credit Lyon-
nais present a similar circumstance involving multiple classes of claimants
having diverse, conflicting interests and, therefore, a contractual resolution
of these conflicting interests should be enforceable in both types of cases.
Furthermore, those cases address circumstances in which the duty
being extinguished resulted in granting directors greater freedom to pro-
mote the interests of shareholders (both cases involved conflicts between
holders of common stock and preferred stock, in which the holders of pre-
ferred stock were unsuccessful). Similarly, one could view a waiver of the
fiduciary duties to creditors as extinguishing a duty that derogates from the
equal force that it makes no sense to permit fiduciary duties owed to limited liability companies to be
waived, so a waiver of duties of loyalty to limited liability companies should not be enforceable.
109 Civil Action No. 12922, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 90 (Del. Ch. June 9, 1993). HB Korenvaes
Investments, L.P. v. Marriott Corp. involved a strategic corporate restructuring-splitting a single
corporation, Marriott Corporation, into two separate, publicly-held corporations-that adversely af-
fected the value of the preferred stock. The split was to be effected by conveying a majority of the
corporation's cash-generating assets to a wholly owned subsidiary of the issuer and distributing the
stock of that new subsidiary to the current common shareholders of the corporation. See id at *3.
The preferred was entitled to 8.25% cumulative dividends and was convertible, at the option
of the holder, into common stock. Marriott announced that it would suspend paying dividends on the
preferred stock after consummation of the distribution, and that dividends would initially be payable
on the distributed stock in an amount equal to the then-current dividends on Marriott's common stock.
The court, assuming that the transaction was for the benefit of the common stock only, held that the
transaction did not violate the fiduciary duty owed to preferred stockholders, on the basis that the
preferential rights of the preferred stockholders were limited to the express anti-dilution protection.
See id. at "18-*21.
110 Civil Action No. 13911, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 134 (Nov. 2, 1995), claims dismissed again,
1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 61 (Del. Ch. May 15, 1996). In this case, the issuer had outstanding a class of
preferred stock, callable at the option of the issuer, upon the occurrence of certain events, at a price per
share equal to the appraised per share value of the common stock. The call price was to be determined
through an appraisal by a "big eight" accounting firm. The complaint alleged that the issuer "improp-
erly selected [the accounting firm] to value the Preferred Stock, .... unfairly excluded [the plaintiff]
from participating in the valuation process; and ... as a result, improperly selected a flawed valuation
methodology that grossly undervalued the Preferred Stock." Id. at *12.
The court held that the fiduciary duties owed to holders of preferred stock did not extend to
this circumstance. See id. at *18. The rights in question were contractual, and the plaintiff could not
prevail by asserting that the defendant's actions violated alternative fiduciary duties owed to the plain-
tiff. See id.
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general principle that fiduciary duties are owed to shareholders. Thus, this
line of cases may support the enforceability of a waiver of the duties cre-
ated by Credit Lyonnais.
The process of dealing with creditors probably makes it impracti-
cable for a corporation to waive these duties were the corporation required
to document the waiver with each creditor. Because directors' personal
assets are at risk under the duty, essentially all, and not merely most,
creditors must be bound by a waiver, if such a waiver were to release di-
rectors from the harsh consequences of the duty. The relative scale of
business corporations' and individuals' assets means that frequently there
is a size of claim against the corporation that will be immaterial to the cor-
poration that nevertheless would be very material to a director required
personally to discharge the claim. Additionally, waiver of these rights
other than through a single act that bound all creditors (e.g., a waiver exe-
cuted individually with each creditor) often could not give the directors an
assurance that all claims had been waived. The transaction costs to confirm
on an ongoing basis that all creditors had signed a waiver frequently would
be prohibitive.
The natural method by which a corporation could attempt to create
a single waiver binding all creditors would be through adopting a charter
provision. Shareholders could argue that this provision should be enforce-
able, just as a shareholder takes subject to senior rights of preferred stock,
as long as the stock certificate references that the charter provides for the
relative rights of classes of stock.1  The express terms of the seniority
need not be delivered to the shareholder, absent an express request.112
Creditors could argue that such a provision would not be sufficient
to deprive them of important rights granted by law. Creditors typically
need not review a corporate charter to determine whether their rights are
subordinated. Thus, for example, creditors could powerfully argue that
permitting the fiduciary duty owed to creditors to be waived in a charter
would be similar to permitting a corporate charter to subordinate some of a
corporation's debt, which would be of substantially questionable enforce-
ability. 113
Additionally, if a charter provision could waive the duties to
creditors of distressed corporations, the same theory would permit a corpo-
111 SeeDEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 151(0 (1991).
112 See id.
113 Cf In re Bicoastal Corp., 600 A.2d 343, 350 (Del. 1991) (stating that "[a] certificate of incor-
poration is viewed as a contract among shareholders," which reference does not include creditors as
parties); cf. also Searle v. Mechanics' Loan & Trust Co., 249 F. 942, 945 (9th Cir. 1918) (noting that a
subordination agreement signed by approximately 90% of a distressed corporation's creditors did not
bind creditors who did not sign the agreement); In re Geo. P. Schinzel & Son, Inc., 16 F.2d 289, 289
(S.D.N.Y. 1926) (indicating that an agreement in which some creditors of a distressed corporation
agreed to subordinate their claims to future creditors did not bind creditors who did not sign the
agreement).
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ration to waive in its charter the duties of directors to creditors upon the
corporation's insolvency. A partial waiver of liability that otherwise would
arise under the trust fund doctrine may be permitted. 4 However, enforce-
ability of the entire abrogation of the duties of directors to act on behalf of
creditors upon insolvency would seem to be the logical, inexorable exten-
sion of enforcing a corporate charter provision waiving the duties to
creditors upon a firm becoming distressed. But that legal result is substan-
tially suspect.
Insurance. Although there are plausible arguments on both sides
of the issue, it would seem more likely that the duties of loyalty owed by
directors of corporations operating in the vicinity of insolvency cannot be
waived. One might argue that the potential for personal liability of direc-
tors will not affect the decisionmaking process, because directors will
merely insure this risk. For a variety of reasons, this possibility does not
mitigate the undesirable consequences of Credit Lyonnais. Coverage under
directors and officers' insurance usually excludes claims brought by or on
behalf of the corporation itself."' A lawsuit by creditors or a creditors'
committee against directors and officers for breach of the fiduciary duty
created by Credit Lyonnais consequently may not be covered by such in-
surance policies. 16 Moreover, insurance policies may not be enforceable
to the extent that they purport to eliminate liability for a breach of a duty
of loyalty.17 Thus, without considering deductibles and policy limits, di-
rectors cannot obtain assurance that they will not be subject to personal
liability for a breach of this duty.
Based on a study published in 1991, Kraakman, Park and Shavell
assert that because shareholder lawsuits are generally settled before a trial,
114 See Murphy v. Panton, 165 P. 1074, 1077-78 (Wash. 1917) (holding that a release under a
subscription agreement of one who had subscribed to purchase stock did not eliminate liability of the
subscriber under the trust fund doctrine to a creditor, because the creditor extended credit to the debtor
from time to time, even though no credit was outstanding as of the time the subscription agreement
was canceled).
115 See Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnification and
Liability Insurance: An Overview of Legal and Practical Issues, 51 Bus. LAw. 573, 604-06 (1996).
This exclusion typically does exclude from coverage claims arising from shareholder derivative ac-
tions. See id. at 604.
116 See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Weis, 148 B.R. 575, 583 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (holding that a lawsuit
filed by a plan committee of a debtor liquidated under Chapter 11 against the debtor's former man-
agement alleging breach of fiduciary duty and negligence asserted a claim excluded by such a policy
provision), aff'd in part, 5 F.3d 532 (8th Cir. 1993).
117 See Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO.
L.J. 1733, 1745 n.33 (1994). However, prior holdings to this effect might not be applicable where the
duty breached involves violating the duty of loyalty as expanded in Credit Lyonnais. The traditional
cause of action alleging a breach of a fiduciary duty of loyalty concerns directors promoting their
personal interests, at the expense of the shareholders. Because the duty created by Credit Lyonnais
may be violated without causing personal benefit to flow to the fiduciaries, a court might find that
insurance covering a breach of the duty in the type of circumstances contemplated by Credit Lyonnais
does not violate public policy.
[VOL. 7:1
HeinOnline  -- 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 80 1998-1999
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
the fact that insurance policies are unenforceable to the extent they insure
against breaches of duties of loyalty does not prevent payments being
made." '8 Based on the typical outcomes in shareholder litigation, one
might speculate that directors may be able to obtain a high degree of con-
fidence that they will not be subject to personal liability, as insurance
companies will settle most cases, obviating the concern about the enforce-
ability of their insurance policies. But, for a variety of reasons, this experi-
ence in the context of shareholder suits is not directly applicable lawsuits
to be brought in the future by creditors alleging a violation of the duty cre-
ated in Credit Lyonnais.
Lawsuits by creditors alleging a breach of the Credit Lyonnais
duty are less likely to be settled. Ownership of creditors' claims is more
likely to be concentrated than ownership of stock." 9 The creditors there-
fore generally will have a greater personal interest in a lawsuit alleging
violation of the duties created in Credit Lyonnais than shareholders have in
a typical shareholder derivative action. A quick settlement controlled by
lawyers to assure payment of a significant legal fee for minimal work is
less likely. Moreover, creditors generally will bring such lawsuits when the
debtor ultimately becomes insolvent. The marginal cost to the creditors of
litigating the issue will be reduced, as the creditors will already have coun-
sel involved in the bankruptcy proceedings. These circumstances make it
less likely that plaintiffs will be willing to accept significant reductions in
the amount to be received from directors or their insurers in the context of
a lawsuit alleging a violation of the duty created in Credit Lyonnais. Set-
tlements are therefore less likely to be achieved.
Even if Kraakman, Park and Shavell's analysis were applicable to
lawsuits alleging violation of this duty, one would expect that insurance
for directors of nearly insolvent firms ultimately would become prohibi-
tively expensive. Insurance companies would realize the high likelihood
that directors of such firms would not follow the requirements of the
nebulous standard created by Credit Lyonnais. Insurance against a risk so
likely to be realized necessarily would be expensive.
118 See id. (citing Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 84 (1991)). Yet recently, insurers have endeavored to remedy this problem, by
providing in directors and officers insurance policies that the parties agree to use their best efforts to
negotiate a reasonable allocation of amounts, where a claim presents matters that are covered by insur-
ance only in part. See Monteleone & Conca, supra note 115, at 618. Most recently, some insurers
have issued policies that provide for a pre-determined allocation of responsibility in certain claims
arising from the sale of securities. See id. at 618-20.
119 Cf. Andrew L. Bab, Note, Debt Tender Offer Techniques and the Problem of Coercion, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 846, 882 (1991) (indicating that ownership of most classes of non-investment grade
bonds is spread among 15 to 30 holders).
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F. Conclusions
This Part argues that Credit Lyonnais, as interpreted by In re
Buckhead America Corp.120 and In re Shultz,12 1 creates potential liability
for directors of distressed corporations that can be very substantial. This
potential liability, of course, can only affect the actions of individuals
aware of the potential liability. These developments in corporation law are
recent; to date, only a few cases have been found involving attempts to
assert fully violations of the duties articulated in Credit Lyonnais. But as
more creditors realize the full implications of these duties and more cases
involving these duties are litigated, the potential liability will become more
apparent to directors.
Over time, the incentives created by these duties are capable of
overwhelming any incentives presented to directors of distressed, solvent
corporations by the potential application of federal bankruptcy law upon
any subsequent insolvency. Credit Lyonnais creates a rule imposing per-
sonal liability on directors. Incentives creating the possibility of personal
liability are more likely to govern directors' actions than federal bank-
ruptcy law's allocation of corporate assets between various claimants.
Even the possibility of voiding payments to insiders as preferences' can-
not be anticipated to create incentives as important as those created by
Credit Lyonnais.
This Part further argues that the incentive scheme imposed by
Credit Lyonnais is extraordinarily vague, creating a risk of personal liabil-
ity that cannot be eliminated by "erring on the side of caution." Attempts
to relieve directors from these liabilities, by contract or through insurance,
are unlikely to be effective. Even if customary insurance policies were
revised to cover these losses and the policies were found to be enforceable
(or payments otherwise were made by the insurer), the high likelihood of a
claim being made would make the insurance prohibitively expensive.
These developments in corporation law also may subject invest-
ment banks (or other professionals) assisting distressed firms to liability
for failure to comply with an amorphous standard. It will be difficult for
such an investment bank plausibly to deny knowledge of the firm's finan-
cial condition, eliminating the defense otherwise most likely to be avail-
able. Imposing a risk of liability on investment banks is not without cost to
distressed firms. The natural consequences will be increased costs borne
by distressed firms and diminished access to necessary assistance, both of
which are likely to increase the likelihood of ultimate insolvency.
120 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance Capital Group,
Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178 B.R. 956, 968 (D. Del. 1994).
121 Miramar Resources, Inc. v. Shultz (In re Shultz), 208 B.R. 723, 729 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
122 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
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V. COSTS OF INSOLVENCY AND IMPACT ON TRADE CREDITORS
Credit Lyonnais announced a legal rule that affects management
decisions governing distressed corporations. That rule, to the extent that it
is followed, will cause the managers of these corporations to adopt policies
that affect the probability that the firms will become insolvent. For exam-
ple, managers of a distressed corporation cannot, under Credit Lyonnais,
adopt a strategy that contemplates (i) providing a reasonable, but not un-
usually high, long-term wealth creating capacity and (ii) maximizing the
short-term cash flow (thereby minimizing the likelihood of bankruptcy
proceedings), where an alternative strategy has significantly higher ex-
pected long-term wealth creating capacity, with a trade-off of a higher
likelihood of insolvency.
It is curious that such a legal rule has been adopted in the name of
increasing the efficiency of corporation law. The legal rule regulates so-
phisticated commercial actors. Whenever a legal rule is adopted in the
pursuit of increased economic efficiency, revising the legal relationship
created among economic actors who have the opportunity to negotiate the
terms of their relationship, it is natural to inquire as to the reasons why
those actors did not themselves contractually adopt the legal rule that a
court imposes. If this relationship is more efficient, why did these actors
not contract for it themselves? 123 A court's imposition of such duties on
sophisticated1 24 actors suggests that the putative increase in efficiency may
be ephemeral and is worthy of scrutiny.
One customary justification for creating a particular legal rule in a
commercial context is that the legal rule is one that most parties would
adopt. 25 But that justification depends on permitting others in circum-
stances that make the default choice inefficient to vary from the choice
otherwise provided by law. This Part argues that the standard announced in
Credit Lyonnais cannot be defended on that basis.
Understanding the efficiency of these developments in corporation
123 See Van Der Weide, supra note 17, at 84-85 ("If corporations could efficiently make manag-
ers fiduciaries for all stakeholders, presumably corporations would do so in exchange for cheaper
labor, supplies, and debt."). But cf. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default
Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 608, 669-70 (1998) (arguing that a status quo bias may cause inefficient
types of contractual relationships to persist). Rasmussen makes a similar argument in connection with
various proposals to change the contours of federal bankruptcy law. His argument is that debtors
should be given the ability to specify contractually which of a number of possible bankruptcy regimes
should apply to the debtor if the debtor becomes insolvent. See Rasmussen, Ex Ante Effects, supra
note 1, at 1210.
124 The rule was applied in the context of a large commercial corporation. Of course, very small
businesses managed by unsophisticated individuals can be incorporated under general incorporation
statutes.
125 See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 971 (1983); Korobkin, supra note 123, at 613-
14.
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law requires an understanding of the economic consequences of bank-
ruptcy. Part V.A examines the costs associated with a corporation becom-
ing insolvent. Various circumstances may cause a corporation's bank-
ruptcy to have a disparate impact on classes of creditors having the same
priority. Part V.B analyzes those differential impacts within classes of
creditors. Part V.C then argues that the rule of Credit Lyonnais favors
those classes of creditors that can vary the choice by contract at the ex-
pense of the interests of classes of creditors who cannot as easily vary the
choice by contract. Thus, the rule of Credit Lyonnais conflicts with the
traditional rationale for selecting a default rule of commercial law.
A. Costs of Insolvency
As discussed above, 126 Credit Lyonnais does not identify those ex-
penditures that should be viewed as "costs." Following the traditional con-
vention that all payments made by the corporation to its creditors, and
profits lost, are considered costs, the total cost incurred by a firm by virtue
of becoming insolvent is difficult to quantify. Among the most easily
quantified costs are the legal fees and other professional and administrative
fees associated with any bankruptcy proceeding (whether in liquidation or
in reorganization), referenced as "direct costs" of the proceeding. 127 One
study of exchange-listed firms estimated those direct costs represent, on
average, 20.6% of the market value of the equity or 3.1% of the book
value of debt plus the market value of equity, or 2.8% of the book value of
total assets.128 But the vast majority of bankruptcy proceedings do not in-
volve exchange-listed firms. 129 For these smaller firms, the direct costs
may be more significant. Whitford indicates, "In cases involving smaller
126 See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
127 See Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question,
39 J. FIN. 1067, 1067 (1984); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation
of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FN. ECON. 285, 288 (1990).
128 See Weiss, supra note 127, at 289, 291 (discussing a sample that included 31 firms, a majority
of which were reorganized). Another study found direct costs of bankruptcy to be six percent of the
total value of the firm just prior to bankruptcy (computed based on the aggregate value of the firm's
outstanding equity, debt and capitalized leases), in a sample of 12 retailers and 7 industrial firms. See
Altman, supra note 127, at 1074 tbl.I, 1075 tbl.ll, 1077. Altman does not clearly identify the extent to
which these firms were liquidated or reorganized. See generally Karen Hopper Wruck, Financial
Distress, Reorganization, and Organizational Efficiency, 27 J. FiN. EON. 419, 436-39 (1990) (col-
lecting a variety of estimates of direct and indirect costs).
129 It has been estimated that 30% of the Chapter 11 cases involve corporations, and the vast
majority of cases involving corporations do not involve publicly held firms. See Samuel L. Bufford,
What Is Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About Its Critics, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 832 (1994).
Warren and Westbrook indicate that only .17% of business bankruptcy filings in a recent year were
made by public companies. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Searching for Reorganiza-
tion Realities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257, 1276 n.37 (1994). Bradley and Rosenzweig find that from
1980 to 1989, only 162 firms listed on either the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock
Exchange filed Chapter 11 petitions. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1059.
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corporations, direct costs commonly represent a sizeable percentage of the
bankruptcy estate. '
Other costs of bankruptcy, "indirect costs," are more difficult to
quantify.' 3 ' Operating costs of the firm increase when the firm approaches
insolvency. 3 2 Whitford asserts that management becomes paralyzed dur-
ing reorganization proceedings, which "is likely to be a major source of
indirect bankruptcy costs."' 33 Problems arising from the firm's insolvency
distract management from their pursuit of other, productive activities
34
Similarly, customers who seek assurance of performance under long-term
obligations, such as warranties, may decline to do business with a firm in a
precarious financial position, decreasing the revenues of such a firm. 3
5
Altman estimated indirect costs of bankruptcy arising from decreased sales
in the years preceding the bankruptcy filing as 10.5% of the firm value (the
firm value computed as of the year of the bankruptcy filing), as compared
to an estimate of direct costs of bankruptcy of 6.2% of the firm value.
136
These indirect costs are thus significant.
A final element of the costs of bankruptcy consists of the costs
arising from the liquidation of the firm. A fundamental assumption under-
lying the structure of Chapter 11 is some bankrupt firms are worth more as
a going concern than the value that would be realized in a forced sale. 137
130 William C. Whitford, What's Right About Chapter 11, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1379, 1381 (1994).
131 One commentator analyzed the change in value of Federated Department Stores during its
bankruptcy proceedings to show that bankruptcy proceedings need not impose excessive costs. See
Steven N. Kaplan, Federated's Acquisition and Bankruptcy: Lessons and Implications, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1103, 1104 (1994). Although for some firms, that the firm is in a bankruptcy proceeding may
cause the firm to adopt beneficial cost-cutting or other strategies that would not have been adopted had
the firm not entered insolvency proceedings, for other firms these proceedings may just be a distraction
that prevents fulfillment of goals that would produce a greater return.
132 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 9, at 341.
133 Whitford, supra note 130, at 1385.
134 See Altman, supra note 127, at 1070-71.
135 See id. at 1071; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 9, at 341-42.
136 Altman, supra note 127, at 1073, 1078. See generally Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Costs
and the New Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. FIN. 477, 485 (1983) (providing an estimate of the upper bound of
costs "due to firms making inefficient decisions vis-a-vis continuing, reorganizing or liquidating").
137 See, e.g., Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11: A
Review of the Evidence, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 131, 133 (1993); Frederick Tung, Confirmation and
Claims Trading, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1684, 1689 (1996). See generally Associates Commercial Corp.
v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 & n.6 (1997) (holding that property, subject to a security interest, to be
retained by the debtor in a cram down under Chapter 13, without the consent of a secured creditor, is to
be valued at its replacement value, and not the value that could be realized at a foreclosure sale).
Professors Baird and Jackson have argued that the proper legal rule might require that an
insolvent firm be sold. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 209-24
(1986); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127,
136-45 (1986). See also Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633
(1993) (discussing mandatory auctions). Although such an approach would eliminate questions of the
valuation of the firm, such a procedure will not necessarily produce the greatest return to creditors.
The dissemination of credible information adequate to permit an appropriate valuation of the bankrupt
may well be not feasible. See Aghion et al., supra note 11, at 855-57 (questioning the efficacy of such
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The costs of judicial rules that make managers choose strategies that are
more likely to cause corporations to become bankrupt include the costs
arising from the liquidation of firms that (i) are more valuable reorganized
but (ii) are liquidated as a result of a failure of negotiations.
Although an assessment of the number of such firms is difficult to
generate, a sense of the potential costs can more easily be provided. The
parties' actions in some circumstances provide a lower bound estimate of
the excess of the costs of liquidation relative to a reorganization. One
manifestation of these costs is the extent to which there are positive devia-
tions in the payments, among creditors having the same priority, to those
creditors, such as trade creditors, whose satisfaction with the proceedings
is necessary to permit a reorganization to proceed. 38 Similarly, some
amounts are paid to shareholders that are necessary to facilitate a reorgani-
zation, in lieu of a liquidation, when more senior claimants are not paid in
full. 139 To the extent that a group of creditors or holders of other interests,
whose ongoing participation is necessary for a successful reorganization,
receives in a bankruptcy reorganization an amount greater than the group
would receive were distributions made in strict accord with priority rules,
those amounts, aggregated for each firm, represent an amount less than a
lower bound on the parties' assessment of the differential in the value of
the firm on a going concern basis and the value of the firm were it liqui-
dated.141 That is, these aggregate amounts represent less than the creditors'
a rule); LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 759 n.289. Roe questioned the
efficacy of an auction of the entire firm, where the firm was large, on the basis that "[o]nly a few firms
may be able to absorb entire operations of a large enterprise." Roe, supra note 61, at 573. Easterbrook
has further questioned the efficiency of a mandatory auction, on the basis that the persistence of legal
rules in the United States that do not mandate such an auction supports the conclusion that the current
legal rules are efficient. Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON.
411, 413 (1990). Part I notes that the Winner's Curse, coupled with the ability of the senior claimant
to make a bid in excess of the amount of the value of its claim, without adverse economic impact,
make some sales structured in certain fashions unlikely to realize the actual value of the firm. See
supra note 12.
138 Cf. Brian L. Betker, An Empirical Examination of Prepackaged Bankruptcy, FIN. MGT.,
Spring 1995, at 3, 5, 8 (noting that 22 out of 49 firms in a sample of firms reorganizing in a pre-
packaged bankruptcy obtained judicial approval to pay trade creditors in the ordinary course, and 41 of
the 49 paid trade creditors in full, concluding that these payments were made to avoid costs of disrup-
tions that otherwise would have arisen).
139 See Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule
in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FiN. 1457, 1458, 1468 (1990) ("The length of the delay in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings is negatively related to the proportion of the total distribution that shareholders are
given in violation of the [absolute priority rule].").
140 A similar analysis applies to any discrepancy in deviations from the priority rules between
out-of-court reorganizations and reorganizations under Chapter 11. Franks and Torous argue that
differences in deviations from the priority rules between formal and informal reorganizations represent
a lower bound on the decrease in the value of the firm attributable to the proceedings avoided. Julian
R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, A Comparison of Financial Recontracting in Distressed Exchanges
and Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 349, 350 (1994). However, they do not discuss the
extent to which this amount in fact represents only a fraction of a lower bound. See generally Lucian
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assessments of the excess of the direct and indirect costs of liquidation
over the direct and indirect costs of reorganization.
An example can illustrate this point. Consider a bankrupt firm
with unsecured, unsubordinated creditors consisting of a bank, represent-
ing 75% of the claims in bankruptcy, and trade creditors, representing 25%
of the claims in bankruptcy. Assume that the property distributed in a re-
organization has an aggregate value of $800, of which the bank receives
65% and the trade creditors receive 35%. That is, the trade creditors get
ten percentage points, or $80, more than their pro rata portion of the prop-
erty distributed. If the bank is to agree to this distribution, the bank must
believe that it is better off in this circumstance than it would be were the
firm liquidated. That is, the bank must believe that were the entity liqui-
dated, the amount realized multiplied by .75 would be less than 65% of
$800, or $520. If the entity were liquidated and the amount realized were
$693, the bank's distribution would be $693 x .75, or $520. Thus, we can
conclude that the bank's willingness to pay the trade creditors $80 more
than they would receive in liquidation means that the bank estimates that
the entity, if liquidated, would yield no more than the value of the firm on
a reorganized basis less $107. Thus, the differential in values between the
firm on a liquidated and a reorganized basis must be greater than the addi-
tional portion of the value of the firm distributed to the trade creditors. 141
One study of reorganizations found that shareholders, on average,
received 7.6% of the aggregate value of the distributions to all claimants
(i.e., 7.6% of the value of the reorganized firm), over and above that which
they would have received had the priority rules been followed.'42 As that
percentage represents only a fraction of the lower bound of the differential
of the value of the firm reorganized over its value on a liquidated basis,1 43
it is clear that the costs of liquidating a firm that should be reorganized
may be significant. Of course, there may be a selection bias, in that those
firms in which reorganization negotiations are unsuccessful may be more
likely to involve a smaller differential between liquidation value and reor-
ganization value. Thus, the data support only the conclusion that the cost
Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganiza-
tion, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 253, 254 (1992) (developing a sequential bargaining model of the negotia-
tions in corporate reorganizations under Chapter 11).
141 A more general derivation of this principle is provided in Appendix I.
142 See infra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
143 For many of the firms in that study, the amount of the payments to the stockholders represents
the lower bound, and not a fraction of the lower bound, because the value distributed to the stockhold-
ers was sufficiently small that the creditors would not have been paid in full, even had they retained all
distributions made to the stockholders. See Eberhart et a., supra note 139, at 1463 tbl.IH. Thus, for
those firms, as used in Appendix L FB.L=I. See infra Appendix I.
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of failed reorganization negotiations may be substantial for a particular
debtor, but the amount of the cost is not now capable of precise quantifi-
cation.
B. Differential Impact on Classes of Creditors
The literature includes some discussion of whether solvency-
related changes in fiduciary duties should benefit particular classes of con-
stituencies. One commentator asserts that it is appropriate to treat equally
banks, on the one hand, and bondholders, on the other hand.1" Harvey, on
the other hand, in discussing the benefits of a fiduciary duty owed to
creditors, distinguished bondholders from trade or other creditors. 145 In his
view, creditors other than bondholders have certain other protections, such
as the priority for wages in bankruptcy. t" Thus, he indicates, the argument
in favor of extending a fiduciary duty to creditors to limit "overinvest-
ment" is of diminished force in respect of creditors other than
bondholders. 147 This Article also addresses different types of concerns
arising from the distinctions among different types of creditors, but
reaches different conclusions.
Selecting the long-term time horizon as that which directors of
distressed corporations should promote may have a curious and obscure
restriction on the range of corporate actions that are permissible. Credit
Lyonnais authorizes or requires directors of distressed corporations to
modify the criteria by which corporate strategies are judged. The opinion
discusses high risk transactions, which may be preferred by the sharehold-
ers, as well as strategies that maximize the corporation's long-term wealth
creating capacity. 148 But Credit Lyonnais does not expressly authorize the
consideration of strategies that promise a greater likelihood of ongoing
solvency in exchange for a diminished long-term wealth creating capacity.
Yet strategies that promote a firm's ongoing solvency are significant, as
LoPucki has noted that managers of nearly insolvent firms, instead of un-
dertaking last-minute excessively risky transactions, often persistently
pursue actions designed principally to maintain their firms' solvency at the
expense of maximizing profits. 14 9
144 See Roberts, supra note 10, at 288-89. That commentator, in discussing Credit Lyonnais,
groups "bondholders and convertible debt or debenture holders" as creditors who have "the barest and
certainly most contingent and defeasible interest in the equity or shareholdership status of the com-
pany." Id. at 289.
145 David M.W. Harvey, Bondholders' Rights and the Case for a Fiduciary Duty, 65 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 1023, 1025 n.8 (1991).
146 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1994).
147 See Harvey, supra note 145, at 1025 n.8.
148 See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civil Action No.
12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
149 Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy
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Which creditors' interests are promoted by selecting the long-term
time-frame, to the exclusion of strategies that merely promote ongoing
firm solvency? Are there concerns with promoting that group's interests?
One method by which one can determine the extent to which a
debtor's insolvency has a differential impact on various classes of claim-
ants involves examining the results of consensual reorganizations of cor-
porations outside the auspices of bankruptcy proceedings. In a voluntary
reorganization, negotiating differential treatment of creditors having the
same priority is costly. Doing so entails assessing the relative values of
different types of consideration to be distributed. No such assessment is
required if each member of the same priority level receives the same type
of consideration. If creditors voluntarily agree to distribute different types
of consideration among claimants of the same priority, that differential
treatment would indicate that the debtor's insolvency does not equally
affect the different types of creditors. Such differential treatment is, in fact,
common.
Facts of Consensual Reorganizations. When firms are reorganized
in bankruptcy proceedings, as opposed to being liquidated, distributions
frequently are made that either (i) provide for disproportionate payments to
a subset of creditors having the same seniority or (ii) provide for payment
to a class of creditors or claimants notwithstanding that a more senior class
is not paid in full. 5' For example, one researcher found that the priority
System, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 311, 338.
150 An "absolute priority rule" is set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2), which has been described as
follows:
Except as specifically modified by statute for the period of court-supervised reor-
ganization, a plan of reorganization may not allocate any property whatsoever to
any junior class on account of their interests or claims in a debtor unless all senior
classes consent, or unless such senior classes receive property equal in value to the
full amount of their allowed claims or the debtor's reorganization value, whichever
is less.
7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.04[41[a][i], at 1129-85 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1998).
As used in this Article, the phrase "deviation from priority rules" and correlative phrases include
deviations from those priority rules with the consent of holders of senior claims. Others may describe
such consensual deviations as violations of the absolute priority rule, which would not be technically
accurate. See generally William Beranek et al., Much Ado About Nothing: Absolute Priority Devia-
tions in Chapter 11, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 1996, at 102, 103-04 (criticizing the characterization of
distributions to junior creditors with the consent of senior creditors who are not paid in full as devia-
tions from the absolute priority rule).
For purposes of computing the compliance with the absolute priority rule, a variety of factors
may cause property to be valued in a fashion that does not reflect its market value. For example,
selecting an unreasonably low interest rate at which to value future payment streams to be given to a
secured creditor may cause a secured creditor to receive less than the amount that would be received in
liquidation. See Baird, supra note 16, at 915. The issue of selecting a discount rate for deferred pay-
ments also arises in connection with unsecured claims. One commentator has stated:
There are few cases specifically addressing the interest rate that must be paid to
yield present value for an unsecured claim. The analysis of interest rates for se-
cured claims is generally equally applicable to unsecured claims, which would
probably require a higher rate due to greater risk. A couple of cases, however,
have concluded that a "market" rate analysis is not required for unsecured claims,
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rules were violated in 87% of the twenty-four Chapter 11 reorganizations
he studied.' 5 ' Other researchers found that shareholders receive, on aver-
age, 7.6% of the total award to all claimants in reorganizations (i.e., 7.6%
of the firm value) over that which they would receive were the priority
rules followed.' 52
A firm's insolvency may have varying effects on different types of
creditors within the same priority level. These variations may arise in
terms of the value of the property distributed, as well as in terms of the
type of property distributed. Weiss found that "[w]ithin the various classes
of unsecured creditors .... strict priority of claims rarely holds." '153 A re-
cent survey addressed the variations in the type of consideration received.
In that survey of forty-five distressed firms that restructured their debt
"informally," i.e., in an exchange offer for publicly listed securities outside
Chapter 11, 88% of the distributions to trade debt were in cash, with the
but merely an interest sufficient to cover inflation or a "real" interest rate, with no
factor for risk or profit.
4 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 93:11, at 121 (William L. Norton, Jr., ed., 2d ed.
Supp. 1997) (footnote omitted).
Treatment of holders of unsecured claims can be even more uncertain, because these claim-
ants may receive any type of property, see id. § 93:11, at 93-37 to 93-38, creating an entirely different
dimension of uncertainty.
On a larger scale, the assignment of a value to an entity suffers from similar uncertainty. A
variety of methods may be used and, "[riegardless ... of the method used, the result will rarely, if
ever, be without doubt or variation." 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra, 1129.06[2][c], at 1129-
170. A bankruptcy court retains significant discretion, because these valuations constitute matters of
fact that will be upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous. See id
151 See Weiss, supra note 127, at 294. Weiss studied 37 firms, two of which, Ronco Telepro-
ducts and Tenna Corp., were liquidated under Chapter 7. Id. at 291, 308 thl.4, 311 tbl.4. Weiss found
priority rules were violated for 29 of the 37 firms. Id. at 299. As the priority rules were not violated in
either of the liquidations under Chapter 7, see id. at 295 tbl.3, the priority rules were violated in 29 of
the 35 cases filed under Chapter 11, or 83%. See id. Five of these 29 firms nevertheless were liqui-
dated. Id. at 302-04 tbl.4, 307 tbl.4 (Brody, Crompton Co., Flanigan's Enterprises, Garland Corp. and
Morton Shoe). Of the remaining 24 firms that filed under Chapter 11 that were not liquidated, the
priority rules were not violated in the reorganizations of only three, or 13%. See id. at 295 tbl.3.
Beranek et al. argue that Weiss overstates the deviations from the priority rules, by catego-
rizing as such deviations distributions to general unsecured creditors, made pari passu with distribu-
tions to secured creditors, in respect of the undersecured portion of secured creditors' claims. Beranek
et al., supra note 150, at 105-06.
Professor Whitford has argued that the disparate outcomes in reorganizations may be, at least
in part, a result of the fact that there may be a divergence among types of creditors in respect of the
extent to which each type is a "repeat" player. William C. Whitford, Comment, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
1027, 1028-29 (1994).
152 See Eberhart et al., supra note 139, at 1458 (discussing a sample of 30 reorganizations). For
purposes of calculating the amount of the deviation from the priority rules, Eberhart, Moore and Roen-
feldt value securities traded on a market that are distributed in a reorganization on the basis of market
prices on the respective distribution dates, to the extent available. Id. at 1462. However, as noted
above, a bankruptcy judge has significant latitude in making required valuation decisions in a cram
down under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994). See supra note 150. These results therefore do not necessar-
ily reflect the amounts of the deviations from the priority rules, if any, that would be attributed to the
respective plans in judicial proceedings.
153 Weiss, supra note 127, at 294.
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remainder allocated between senior debt and equity.'54 For the same firms,
the distributions to junior debt were 2% in cash, 11% in senior debt, 13%
in junior debt, 3% in preferred stock, 67% in equity and 3% in other prop-
erty.'55 Even for senior debt, only 29% of the distributions were in cash.'56
Similar results were seen in distributions in Chapter 11 reorganizations,
but with each group receiving a greater percentage of distributions in
cash. 15 7 Thus, trade creditors receive substantially disproportionate distri-
butions in the form of cash.
Additional Losses by Trade Creditors. The cost of negotiating dif-
ferential treatment between and within classes of creditors in consensual
reorganizations indicates that different classes of creditors are affected
differently by a debtor's bankruptcy. These facts indicate that where a
debtor having trade creditors and other creditors is liquidated with the
trade creditors and other creditors receiving in cash identical fractions of
their claims, 15 8 the harm per dollar of claim will be greater to trade credi-
tors than to other creditors. However, even in respect of debtors that are
reorganized outside Chapter 11, evidence indicates that a portion of the
value of the distressed firm's assets-a portion that otherwise would ac-
crue to trade creditors-is diverted to third parties who profit by purchas-
ing trade claims. A brief review of that market, and a review of the evi-
dence of gains realized by third parties who purchase trade claims, fol-
lows.
The market for claims against debtors being reorganized under
Chapter 11 has been growing in recent years,15 9 and the topic has been
increasingly important to practicing lawyers, as firms have attempted to
use this market to facilitate unsolicited acquisitions of firms being reor-
ganized under Chapter 11. "6 Within the market for claims against debtors
being reorganized under Chapter 11, transactions in trade claims are be-
coming increasingly prominent.1 6' It has been estimated that the market for
these claims is over $1 billion annually.1 62 It should be noted, however,
154 See Franks & Torous, supra note 140, at 350, 356 tbl.3.
155 See id. at 356 tbl.3.
156 See id.
157 See id.
158 See II U.S.C. § 726(b) (1994) (requiring pro rata distributions among holders of each sepa-
rate kind of claim).
159 See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Developments in Trading Claims and Taking
Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 2 (1990).
160 See id. at 2-3 (citing examples).
161 See Rich Wilner, Last Six Months a Feast for Vulture Funds, DAILY NEWS REC., Feb. 12,
1996, at 10 ("In more and more cases, vendors are taking advantage of the liquidity of their claims and
selling them off to use the cash in purchasing more raw materials for their businesses.").
162 See Rich Wilner, Explosion in Trade Claims Market Is Good News, Fast Cash for Vendors,
DAILY NEWS REC., Oct. 11, 1995, at 2. The annual trading volume in distressed bank debt for 1993
was estimated at almost $1 billion. See Stuart C. Gilson, Investing in Distressed Situations: A Market
Survey, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 8. These two figures are not directly comparable, as
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that the market for claims is generally limited to reorganizations (as op-
posed to liquidations), and even then the trading is only in the claims of
firms that are reporting companies under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.163
The available evidence, which is somewhat anecdotal as a result of
the absence of data, supports the notion that large profits are available to
those who purchase trade creditors' claims against bankrupt firms. Based
on a review of forty-three reorganizations of large firms in Chapter 11,
LoPucki and Whitford argue that the original public securityholders and
trade creditors do not benefit from deviations from the priority rules.
Rather, they indicate that profits are extracted by third parties who pur-
chase those claims. 64 Returns of twenty-five percent to those who pur-
chase trade claims for a typical holding period of six months are the
norm. 65 Tilton and Lewis note the following examples of such trading in
claims:
For example, in In re Revere Copper and Brass Inc., Phoenix Capital Corp. purchased
28 trade claims against the debtor for approximately 20 cents on the dollar. Less than a
month later, The Wall Street Journal reported that the debtor was preparing to file a plan
which would pay creditors between 65 and 100 cents on the dollar. Concerned that unso-
phisticated creditors may not be aware of their rights and options under Chapter 11, the
court provided each assignor, a 30 day option to rescind its trade.
Similarly, in the LTV case, the court refused to approve the transfer of over 400
claims purchased for 33 cents on the dollar. The court found that the purchaser failed to
provide its sellers with adequate information which included that [sic] fact that the pur-
chaser was actually a front for a company trying to acquire control of LTV Energy Products
one appears to address the amount outstanding, whereas the other represents the amount traded within
a specific period.
163 See Herbert P. Minkel, Jr. & Cynthia A. Baker, Claims and Control in Chapter 11 Cases: A
Call for Neutrality, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 35, 44 n.32 (1991).
164 LoPucki & Whitford, Equity's Share, supra note 1, at 183. However, there is evidence indi-
cating that there are no abnormal returns to purchasers of distressed bonds. See Alan C. Eberhart &
Richard J. Sweeney, Does the Bond Market Predict Bankruptcy Settlements?, 47 J. FIN. 943, 969
(1992). Gilson indicates that although no empirical studies have been done on the returns to those who
purchase trade credit or bank claims, "the existence of profitable trading rules seem unlikely here."
Gilson, supra note 162, at 13.
165 Wilner, supra note 162 (stating that brokers have hurdle rates of 25% and that the claims are
typically held for six months and then resold to "mutual fund operators or other investors," not clearly
identifying the 25% hurdle rate as a per annum figure). Significantly, these claims are frequently
resold to others, with a view to making a further profit. See also William Beranek & Steven L. Jones,
The Emerging Market for Trade Claims of Bankrupt Firms, 23 FIN. MGMT., Summer 1994, at 78
(stating that investors in trade claims "indicated they require a return of 20% to 30%, which they
believe is commensurate with the risk they bear"); Valerie Seckler, Vultures' Wings Cast Dark Shadow
in Chap. 11 Cases, DAILY NEWS REC., Sept. 14, 1994, at 10 ("For the most part, sources said[,] vul-
tures tend to reap handsome returns on their investments because they are big-money players with
sophisticated knowledge bases, both essential traits for obtaining the windfall profits they're seek-
ing.").
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Inc. through claims purchases and that it intended to propose a 100 cent plan after acquiring
the claims.'6
Reasons the Market for Trade Claims Is Not Efficient. That un-
usual profits may be available to those purchasing trade claims requires
that the market not be efficient. The nature of the market supports the con-
clusion that the market is not efficient.167 One purchasing a trade claim, as
an assignee of a trade creditor, takes the claim subject to all defenses the
debtor has against the trade creditor, absent an agreement to the
contrary. 168 In this regard, the purchase of trade claims raises legal issues
to a greater extent than the purchase of claims arising under an extension
of credit for money borrowed. For example, one purchasing a trade claim
may acquire an asset subject to a defense arising out of a breach of war-
ranty. 69 Such a defense generally would not arise against an assignee of
right to receive payment of money borrowed. 7 °
A typical resolution of this legal issue involves requiring the seller
of a trade claim to provide warranties as to title to the claim and the ab-
sence of any defense to the claim.'7' A purchaser relying on the seller's
warranty assumes the risk that the seller will be unable to perform its war-
ranty obligations. Purchasers of trade claims therefore usually investigate
the solvency of the sellers before agreeing to purchase claims.'72 Thus,
relative to the market for bank debt (and other debt for money borrowed)
of distressed corporations, the market for trade claims of those debtors
involves additional types of risks (the potential insolvency of a seller of a
claim) and additional documentation and negotiation costs. These factors
distinguish the market for trade claims from the market for other claims
against bankrupt corporations.
Willingness of Trade Creditors to Sell at Low Prices. A variety of
166 Richard N. Tilton & Kenneth M. Lewis, Trading in Claims: The Case for a Free Market,
N.Y. L.J., Oct. 7, 1993, at 5 (footnote omitted). That a few courts have identified and attempted to
provide some remedy to holders of trade claims in the most egregious cases does not imply that the
judicial system limits large profits in the market as a whole to any material extent.
167 See generally Bufford, supra note 129, at 846 ("Bankruptcy is overwhelmingly a result of
imperfect markets and high transaction costs. Permitting the functioning of imperfect markets is much
of what Chapter 11 is about. Virtually no market in which bankruptcy operates is a perfect market,").
168 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1981).
169 See id.; U.C.C. § 9-318 (1995); see, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Master Auto Serv. Corp., 693
F.2d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 1982).
170 Of course, there is a possibility that the transaction was part of a fraudulent conveyance.
Absent fraud by the seller of the claim, determination of whether there is a possibility that there is a
fraudulent conveyance defense should initially be straightforward.
171 See Beranek & Jones, supra note 165, at 79. Similar types of warranties can nevertheless be
sought in connection with the purchase of claims arising under obligations for money borrowed. Yet
the provision of such representations and warranties in connection with the sale of all claims of bank-
rupts is not universal, and disagreements on the scope of any representations and warranties may
prevent consummation of a sale where there has been an agreement on the other (i.e., financial) terms.
See Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 159, at 18-19.
172 See Beranek & Jones, supra note 165, at 79.
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 93 1998-1999
GEO. MASON L. REv.
factors may contribute to the willingness of trade creditors to participate in
a market in which third parties realize large profits at trade creditors' ex-
pense, including information asymmetries and other business requirements
of trade creditors.
Even though, as noted above, 173 the market for claims against in-
solvent debtors is generally confined to firms that are reporting companies,
trade creditors frequently lack the ability to assess accurately the value of
their claims against a bankrupt firm. Transactions costs limit the extent to
which trade creditors can obtain the contractual right to obtain non-public
financial information from the debtor, which a bank or other institutional
lender can acquire more easily. Notably absent from the process of trading
in claims is a requirement that the purchaser provide a disclosure statement
to the seller. In fact, purchasers are not even required to disclose the terms
of prior purchases. 17 4 There is some suggestion that trade creditors in fact
receive overly pessimistic information, which is a factor in the significant
profits obtained by those who purchase trade claims.'75 The information
available from services reporting on the solvency of debtors is not an ade-
quate substitute. 17
6
Even the public availability of significant amounts of information
about a distressed corporation may not eliminate bargain sales of trade
claims. Although trade creditors are sometimes large firms, that fact does
not necessarily imply they will have the expertise to assess accurately the
value of a trade claim in light of available information. 77 Making such
173 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
174 See Joy Flowers Conti et al., Claims Trafficking in Chapter 11-Has the Pendulum Swung
Too Far?, 9 BANKR. DEVS. J. 281, 299 (1992); Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 159, at 4. Disclosure of
the consideration paid was required in some contexts under a former version of Bankruptcy Rule 3001.
See id. at 22-23.
175 See, e.g., The Operation of the Bankruptcy System Before the House Judiciary Comm. Com-
mercial and Administrative Law Subcomm. (Apr. 16, 1997) (Prepared Statement of Charles Tatelbaum,
Vice President for Research, American Bankruptcy Institute), available in LEXIS, News Library,
Allnws File ("It is claimed that creditors (especially smaller creditors) often received exaggerated
'doomsday' assertions or disinformation in an attempt to purchase the claim at a lower price.").
176 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 885 n.103 (stating that such services provide informa-
tion of "limited value," because their information is incomplete, fails to include significant details and
is often inaccurate and untimely). But cf. Note, Creditors' Derivative Suits on Behalf of Solvent Cor-
porations, 88 YALE L.J. 1299, 1306 n.38 (1979) ("The existence of Dun & Bradstreet... and myriad
other credit-rating agencies is persuasive evidence that trade creditors, like other investors, take risk
into account before committing their resources.").
177 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 885 ("Even trade suppliers.., are believed to have
neither the time nor the expertise to evaluate precisely individual firm risk."); Tung, supra note 137, at
1700; Wilner, supra note 162 (quoting one market participant as saying, "Institutional investors like us
have experience in taking on risk while vendors don't have experience gauging investment risk. That's
not their business."). But see Shehzad L. Mian & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Accounts Receivable Man-
agement Policy: Theory and Evidence, 47 J. FiN. 169, 172 (1992) (arguing that trade creditors can
monitor debtors as a part of regular visits to their customers).
Schwarcz disputes the notion that trade creditors are at a disadvantage in contracting with
debtors. Schwarcz, supra note 52, at 663 ("It is not compelling to argue that [trade creditors] are
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assessments may require the expenditure of significant sums not justified
by the amount of a particular claim. 7 8
Additionally, the cash requirements generated by a trade creditor's
business may pressure trade creditors to sell quickly trade claims against
insolvent debtors, even at the expense of yielding significant profits to
those who purchase the claims. Reorganization under Chapter 11 com-
monly lasts at least foitr years. 7 9 A variety of commentators has noted
that, in this context, trade creditors willingly take a significant loss, in or-
der to receive cash promptly.
180
Inability to Diversify. The costs to trade creditors of the insolvency
of a debtor are compounded by limitations on the ability to diversify.
Firms that extend trade credit are likely to extend credit to firms in similar
lines of business. Trade credit is necessarily extended by a firm to firms
that purchase the types of goods or services that the trade creditor pro-
vides. For example, a firm that manufactures and sells computer compo-
nents is likely to extend trade credit to firms that assemble and sell com-
puters, although the component manufacturer might also have customers in
other industries. Defaults on the trade claims that the component manu-
facturer holds will occur in bunches or groups, making its portfolio of
trade claims volatile.' Banks and insurance companies can diversify by
lending to corporations in different industries. Trade creditors, on the other
hand, can diversify only by manufacturing products that are sold to differ-
'weaker' than the corporate debtors with which they deal ....").
178 Wilner states that buyers of claims who participated in a Financial Roundtable discussion
"[e]ach... said [he] consult[s] financial experts for the valuations and bankruptcy attorneys for an
estimated length of time the retailer is expected to remain in Chapter 11. With these results in hand,
the vulture funds can then calculate the present value of money and then price the claim." Wilner,
supra note 161.
179 See Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 159, at 6.
180 See Conti et al., supra note 174, at 299 (quoting Bankruptcy Proposals to Curb Judicial
Activism in Trade Claim Sales, CORP. FINANCING WK., Aug. 13, 1990, at 1, to the following effect:
"Small suppliers, the owners of the trade claims, often need to make payroll and have liquidity needs
that force them to sell immediately at large discounts, such as 20 cents on the dollar, because they
cannot wait the three to five years it might take for the company to file a reorganization plan that is
accepted by all the parties."); Gilson, supra note 162, at 23; cf. Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 159, at 7
("Most creditors are in business to collect cash from their debtor--cash back for cash advanced, cash
paid for goods sold, or cash received for services rendered. Many of these creditors do not want secu-
rities from their debtor under a plan of reorganization unless the securities can immediately be sold for
cash, which may not always be the case."); Roe, supra note 61, at 543 ("Although trade creditors
should be interested in maximizing firm viability, thus enhancing a market for the trade creditors'
product, the average trade creditor is ill-suited to provide a long-term commitment voluntarily. The
cost of voluntarily converting a claim to a long-term interest, the cost of negotiating for the viable
structure, and the benefit of an immediate cash payment for its claim are likely to outweigh the amor-
phous, uncertain benefit of increasing the long-run viability of one customer.").
181 See Jackson & Scott, supra note 2, at 168 n.26. More precisely, one might say that the trade
creditor's aggregation of a group of trade claims has produced a portfolio less diversified than would
be produced were the portfolio to include claims against debtors in various industries. So the portfolio
does not eliminate industry-specific risk.
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ent industries-a more difficult and sometimes impossible task.'82
Value Provided by Purchasers of Trade Claims. One could argue
that purchasers of trade claims realize these profits because they add value
to the distressed corporation. Two possible sources of additional value are
(i) a decrease in collective action problems and (ii) the provision of mana-
gerial advice. Only a heuristic discussion of these viewpoints can be pro-
vided.
Credit Lyonnais, In re Buckhead America Corp. and In re Shultz
impose on directors a duty to adopt strategies that make it more likely that
corporations will become insolvent. These developments in corporation
law essentially represent a "tax" on the corporate form. That is, they trans-
fer some portion of a corporation's value to third parties upon insolvency.
Arguing that those purchasing trade claims of insolvent corporations add
value by decreasing collective action problems assumes the incorrect
frame of reference. Absent these legal principles, directors could choose
alternative strategies that would increase the chance that there would be no
insolvency-that the collective action problems would not arise at all.
These costs necessarily affect the value of the corporate form as a
whole. Creditors must ultimately include in the cost of goods the expected
value of any such transfers to those purchasing trade claims. Those costs
represent a "tax," in the sense that they increase the cost of doing
business.'83 A legal framework that diverts some portion of value of doing
business in the corporate form to third parties necessarily decreases social
welfare. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, when considering engaging
in a new business, do not ascribe a positive value to payments to third par-
ties. At the margin, as costs of goods and services acquired on trade credit
increase, otherwise potentially profitable ventures become marginally un-
profitable and not worth pursuing.
One possible alternative explanation for the extraordinary profits
earned by those purchasing trade claims is that by participating in the
firm's management or reorganization, they add value to the firm. In this
view, these purchasers add expertise, and they command large, short-term
returns, in exchange for sharing that expertise with an insolvent firm.
It is difficult to identify the extent to which those purchasing trade
claims in fact add value in the form of contributing management expertise,
although there is some evidence to support that conclusion. Hotchkiss and
Mooradian found a statistically significant, positive effect on the debtor's
182 One might assert that trade creditors can diversify by making passive investments in other
industries. But that resolution would not be satisfactory to the trade creditors' own lenders. Such a
firm would be able to engage in the near-insolvency excessive risk-taking predicted by the economic
theory underlying Credit Lyonnais.
183 See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 9, at 308, 313 (identifying the welfare loss of a
principal arising from an agency relationship and arguing that the original owner-manager, as opposed
to outside equity investors, will bear this loss).
[VOL. 7:1
HeinOnline  -- 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 96 1998-1999
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
industry-adjusted, post-bankruptcy financial performance was associated
with (i) a vulture 84 gaining control of the debtor, (ii) an affiliate of a vul-
ture becoming chairman of the board or chief executive officer of the
debtor, and (iii) such an affiliate otherwise becoming a member of the
debtor's board of directors. 185 However, no such effect arose where a vul-
ture acquired an interest in the debtor but did not participate in its man-
agement in one of those three capacities, which represented forty-seven
percent of the sample of debtors identified by Hotchkiss and Mooradian.186
To the extent that those purchasing trade claims realize profits
from adding value to debtors, those profits do not represent a societal loss.
However, a large majority of the profits realized at the expense of trade
creditors are not attributable to value added by vultures. As noted above,1 87
much of the gains realized in purchasing claims from trade creditors are
realized by those who resell the claims (and who thus, one would expect,
do not provide this type of benefit to debtors). And a vulture necessarily
provides no benefit to the debtor in the significant number of cases where
the vulture does not participate in the debtor's management.
Significance of Trade Creditors. Adoption of a rule of corporation
law that disadvantages trade creditors would be inconsequential if trade
credit represented an insignificant portion of all corporate debt. That is not
the case.
Trade creditors may hold claims representing a material portion of
a firm's outstanding debt. For example, in manufacturing companies, trade
credit represents twenty-eight percent of the aggregate of trade credit plus
long-term bank debt and other long-term debt.188 In addition, small firms
rely on trade credit as a source of financing to an even greater extent than
larger firms,1 89 which firms, as discussed above, 190 represent the vast ma-
184 Vultures are firms that purchase assets or securities of distressed businesses. See JERRY M.
ROSENBERG, DICTIONARY OF INVESTING 358 (1993).
185 See Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the Market for Control
of Distressed Firms, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 415 (1997).
186 See id. at 417,420-21.
187 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
188 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORT FOR MANUFACTURING,
MINING, AND TRADE CORPORATIONS, FIRST QUARTER 1996, at 4. This percentage represents
264.51(264.5 + 209.8 + 485.5) (in $ billions). See id. Excluded from this computation are current
portions of long-term debt as well as other non-current liabilities. As of the first quarter of 1996, the
Department of Commerce reports for the sampled corporations engaged in manufacturing and nondur-
able manufacturing industries that such firms had, in the aggregate, $264.5 billion of trade debt, $60.6
billion of short-term loans from banks, $82.2 billion in other short-term debt, including commercial
paper, $57.6 billion in current portion of long-term debt, long-term loans from banks of $209.8 billion,
other long-term debt of $485.5 billion and other non-current liabilities, including deferred income
taxes, capitalized leases and minority stockholders' interest in domestic corporations, of $525.1 billion.
See id.
189 See EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & Louis C. GAPENSKI, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 746 (6th ed.
1991).
190 See supra note 129.
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jority of debtors in Chapter 11 proceedings.
C. Disparate Abilities to Negotiate Differential Rights
Part V argues that, at least in some contexts, the rule announced
in Credit Lyonnais is not the most efficient approach to governing dis-
tressed corporations. Significantly, the rule promotes the interests of
creditors who could negotiate for alternative terms and disfavors those
creditors-trade creditors-who cannot as easily contract around the rule
created in Credit Lyonnais.
Even if the duty to maximize a corporation's long-term wealth
creating capacity is one that cannot be waived, in the sense of releasing
directors from personal liability for violations of the duty, a corporation
could more easily "opt out" of the rule were another time horizon selected.
A corporation could negotiate a negative covenant with creditors providing
that when the corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency, the corporation
will not take any one of a specified set of activities without the lender's
consent, if the activity is not consistent with maximizing the corporation's
long-term wealth creating capacity.
This covenant would be enforceable. Corporations often agree not
to undertake certain actions without the consent of lenders. Debt instru-
ments are replete with such covenants. 91 This method of "opting out" of a
legal rule would be effective only where the change intended to benefit
creditors who, as a part of extending credit, already negotiate covenants.
Banks and other lenders negotiate covenants, but such negotiations fre-
quently will not be part of the extension of trade credit.192 Thus, although a
legal rule that benefitted trade creditors in this context could be varied by
contract, the default disadvantaging trade creditors can be varied by con-
tract only with greater difficulty. The rule of Credit Lyonnais, In re Buck-
head America Corp. and In re Shultz thus creates a default rule that disad-
vantages those claimants who are less able to vary the default by con-
tract-a curious outcome for a rule putatively adopted in the name of effi-
ciency.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURE FOR FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN
DISTRESSED CORPORATIONS
Thus far, this Article has argued that there is little evidence that
distressed corporations engage in the excessive risk-taking predicted by
191 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR FOUND., supra note 26, at 402, 457-67 (stating that indentures
commonly restrict the payment of dividends and providing nine alternative samples of covenants
restricting investments).
192 Transaction costs would predominate in any attempt by a bank to negotiate provisions bene-
fitting the trade creditors.
[VOL. 7:1
HeinOnline  -- 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 98 1998-1999
FIDuCIARY DuTIrEs OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
the "overinvestment" theory. Nevertheless, based on that theory, Delaware
precedent 93 holds that directors of distressed, solvent corporations owe
fiduciary duties to constituencies broader than shareholders, that are en-
forceable by those other constituencies.
Although there are a variety of problems in the line of cases be-
ginning with Credit Lyonnais, that fact does not mean that there is no room
for improvement in the manner in which corporation law has traditionally
addressed the conflicts that line of cases addresses. More modest, less
problematic improvements are possible. The absolute delegation rule
would traditionally protect directors of a distressed corporation who de-
termined to attempt to minimize the likelihood that the corporation ulti-
mately became insolvent, even at the expense of foregoing a strategy that
offered increased long-term returns. Such a determination should consti-
tute the selection of a "time horizon" delegated to the board of directors
under Paramount.194 Nevertheless, a clear articulation of that rule would
be desirable to eliminate any possibility that directors would incur liability
to shareholders who were able to construe statements made in the course
of managing a distressed corporation as indicating that actions were taken
for the benefit of creditors at the expense of the shareholders.
Such a holding does not constrain shareholders to any large de-
gree-presumably they could still remove the directors. But it would pre-
vent shareholders looking at the occasion as an option, in which they could
remain passive during the decisionmaking process and yet retain the right
to assert a claim against the directors if their decisions proved to be unfa-
vorable. Because this rule is only defensive, i.e., it merely grants directors
an additional defense against a claim, ambiguity in the definition of "vi-
cinity of insolvency" does not suffer from the same difficulties as when the
duty is one that can be affirmatively enforced against the directors by non-
shareholder constituencies.
A restructured formulation of the duties of directors of distressed
firms might also help restrain self-dealing. Financial distress does not
eliminate directors' incentives to engage in self-dealing. However, when
the firm is in distress, shareholders may have diminished incentives to
monitor or prevent the self-dealing. One might thus conclude that creditors
should have a limited right to initiate a derivative lawsuit, on behalf of the
corporation, challenging any self-dealing transactions by directors of a
firm that was "in the vicinity of insolvency."
Even this limited right would be potentially problematic. As to
193 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civil Action No. 12150,
1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108-*109 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); see also Miramar Resources, Inc. v.
Shultz (In re Shultz), 208 B.R. 723, 729 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance Capital Group, Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178
B.R. 956, 968 (D. Del. 1994).
194 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990).
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holders of long-term debt, it is not clear why such a rule would benefit
creditors who did not obtain by contract the right to bring an action to re-
strain self-dealing.' 95 Granting such a right to holders of publicly issued
bonds would be particularly problematic, if it were intended that directors
of the debtor would engage in self-dealing when the debtor was clearly
solvent. If a trustee possessed such a right, the trustee's desire to avoid
personal liability might result in frequent challenges to transactions with
insiders.
Additionally, the ability of creditors to avoid preferential transfers
made to insiders within one year of a bankruptcy'96 limits the circum-
stances in which such a rule could additionally benefit creditors. Ulti-
mately, it is difficult to imagine that, as to holders of long-term debt, a rule
permitting an action to enjoin self-dealing transactions would benefit the
corporate form in excess of the costs arising from potential bad faith ex-
tractions of fees in exchange for consents to otherwise proper transactions.
The conclusions are less certain as to two types of creditors-trade
creditors and tort claimants. A rule benefitting trade creditors is less likely
to be abused. Trade creditors typically are in an ongoing relationship with
the debtor. These relationships, which trade creditors generally would pre-
fer to continue, would restrain the extent to which trade creditors would
improperly commence a derivative action seeking to enjoin self-dealing.
Tort claimants generally do not have the opportunity to negotiate
for the right to benefit from a fiduciary duty imposed on directors. These
involuntary creditors may present the most compelling situation calling for
increased creditors' rights.
But in any such case, one would have to inquire as to the result
that should obtain if, after full disclosure, the shareholders were to approve
the transaction. Typically, corporate directors make full disclosure in
transactions in which they have a personal interest, and seek shareholder
approval, in order to comply with the requirements of Section 144 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law. 197 It would be troublesome to adopt a
legal rule allowing creditors to initiate or maintain derivative lawsuits
challenging a transaction approved by the shareholders. As shareholders
retain the right to elect directors while the corporation remains solvent,
that legal rule would be likely to result in a quasi-deadlock. Therefore,
even a limited ability for creditors to commence derivative lawsuits chal-
lenging self-dealing would appear to have little value.
One small benefit could be provided to creditors, however. It
195 Such provisions can be and are written (although they may apply even if the debtor is not
distressed). See, e.g., RJR NABISCO CAPITAL CORP., PROSPECTUS, 10'% SENIOR NOTES DuE 1998,
at 88 (Apr. 18, 1991) (on file with author).
196 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
197 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991).
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would not be unreasonable for a distressed corporation to be required to
disclose to trade creditors, or other creditors, prior to a material extension
of credit, any self-dealing transactions made when the corporation was in
distress. Requiring full disclosure (i.e., conditioning an absence of directo-
rial liability on such disclosure) would facilitate a trade creditor's inde-
pendent assessment of whether to extend further credit. Nevertheless, the
minor benefit created by such a rule may not justify the additional com-
plexity it would add to corporation law jurisprudence.
CONCLUSIONS
The available economic evidence supports the notion that the
"overinvestment" problem does not dominate the actions of directors of
distressed corporations. Distressed corporations are not characterized by a
frenzy of excessive risk-taking. Terms of debt directly addressing exces-
sive risk-taking (those that restrict expenditures) without consent neces-
sarily play a role. This Article has provided an expanded discussion of the
methods by which other covenants-financial covenants--can provide
powerful incentives increasingly restricting risk-taking as a corporation
becomes closer to distress or insolvency. The evidence supports the notion
that an analysis of the incentives presented by various possible bankruptcy
law reforms should not assume that "overinvestment" by distressed corpo-
rations produces social costs that cannot be adequately addressed with
contractual devices under current law.
Nevertheless, under a legal theory derived from a presumption that
distressed corporations will engage in excessive risk-taking, courts have
recently held that directors of distressed corporations owe fiduciary duties
that are enforceable by creditors. These cases do not represent awkward
constructions of that precedent. In fact, a detailed review of the precedent
indicates that this construction is well supported.
These developments in corporation law present substantial con-
cerns. Directors of distressed corporations face potential personal liability
for failure to conform their conduct to an amorphous standard. As others
have noted, there is no clear basis for determining when this new duty
arises. Just as significant is that the rule attributes a positive value to pay-
ments to creditors (offsetting the loss to the shareholders from the pay-
ment). Thus, virtually any payment made by a distressed corporation is
accompanied by a receipt by a constituency whose interests the directors
are to promote. There is no feasible algorithm to distinguish those pay-
ments to creditors that have a positive value (in the sense that the receipt
promotes the debtor's interests separate from its permitting the debtor's
retention of consideration in exchange) from payments to the same con-
stituency whose receipt has no value. And unlike other circumstances in
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which the law adopts a nebulous standard to deter undesirable conduct, a
decisionmaker's intentional bias in favor of one class of constituents does
not reduce the risk of liability.
Financial distress may cause a corporation to need the services of
an investment bank. But recent developments in corporation law impose
substantial additional risks on those advisors, for aiding or abetting a vio-
lation of the same nebulous standard. The imposition of such risks must
ultimately inure to the detriment of distressed corporations, by either
eliminating access to advisors or increasing the cost.
Shifting fiduciary duties arising upon a corporation's becoming fi-
nancially distressed also have a differential impact on various types of
creditors. The duty, by its terms, does not permit the adoption of a strategy
designed to promote ongoing solvency if doing so is at the expense of a
greater long-term return. A substantial portion of a firm's creditors typi-
cally will consist of trade creditors. Evidence suggests that these creditors
are particularly harmed by a corporation's bankruptcy. Trade creditors of
insolvent firms in practice appear willing to forego significant profits in
order to secure immediate, if partial, payment in cash. That is, these
creditors are particularly harmed by outcomes that result in their receipt of
non-cash consideration. Contrary to traditional theory for the selection of
an efficient default rule of contract, this rule harms that set of creditors
least capable of negotiating an alternative contractual resolution.
This Article argues that a more modest development in this area
would be desirable-giving directors of distressed firms greater assurance
that strategies designed to enhance ongoing solvency will not result in
personal liability for failing to pursue other strategies. One might seek to
permit creditors of distressed corporations to bring derivative actions
challenging any self-dealing transactions. But as failure to allow a dis-
tressed corporation to consummate transactions approved by the share-
holders would be problematic, even granting creditors the power to bring a
derivative action challenging self-dealing by management offers only lim-
ited benefits.
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APPENDIX I
Assume, without loss of generality, that there are two creditors, a
bank and a trade creditor. The trade creditor provides firm-specific inputs,
such that a reorganization cannot be successful if the trade creditor is not
satisfied. If the bank receives a fraction FBo of the reorganized firm,
whereas the bank would have received a greater fraction FBL of the firm,
had it been liquidated, a condition necessary for the bank voluntarily to
pay the "bribe" is that:
FB,o Vo > VL FBL
Where FBo represents the fraction of the firm's value distrib-
uted to the bank when the firm is reor-
ganized, i.e., it remains ongoing
FBL represents the fraction of the firm's value that
would be distributed to the bank were
the firm liquidated and the bank and the
trade creditor paid pro rata
Vo represents the aggregate value of all property dis-
tributed in the reorganization to the bank
and the trade creditor
VL represents the aggregate value of all property that
would be distributed in a liquidation to
the bank and the trade creditor
Otherwise, the bank would not agree to pay the bribe.
This inequality implies that the bank must believe that the value of
the firm, as liquidated, does not exceed the following, assuming FBL >0:
VL< FBO Vo
FB,L
Thus, the disparity in the firm value, depending on whether the
firm remains ongoing or is liquidated, Vo - VL, is represented by the fol-
lowing:
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This disparity is always greater than Vo (FBL - FBo). This result
can be shown by demonstrating that the disparity minus Vo (FBL - FBo) is
always greater than zero, assuming FBL>FB,O:
V°1-F - -V(FBL-FBo)
Rearranging this expression yields the following:
Vo ( FL - F.o)- (F,L- FB, FBL))FB, L
Vo (FBL-FB,O )( 1-FBz)
FB,L
Where FBL and FB,0 are positive, this expression is always positive
for FBL>FBo and FBL<I, indicating that the bank's estimate of the value
of the liquidation cost of the firm exceeds the product of the increase in the
fraction of the reorganized firm paid to the trade creditors multiplied by
the value of the firm, as reorganized on an ongoing basis-Vo (FBL -Fo).
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